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Title of Study:  THE OPACITY OF PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY 
Major Field:  BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
ABSTRACT: Calls for greater transparency among corporations and social institutions 
continue to grow in the literature. Many contend that greater transparency is needed to 
reduce potential for wrong doing and enhance the capacity of interested outsiders to 
protect the public’s interests. Yet, transparency is not a cost free objective, there are 
consequences to imposed transparency. This research contributes to the opacity and 
transparency literature by probing for a deeper understanding of organizational and 
environmental factors that lead to opaque practices, exploring both negative and positive 
outcomes of opacity and investigating practices that can help reduce adverse effects of 
opacity between collaborating entities. Private philanthropy presented an interesting 
sector for studying opacity and its potential consequences, including potential for public 
benefits. Researchers have expressed concerns about private philanthropy’s systematic 
lack of transparency and external accountability, which is further exacerbated by effects 
of disparate power. The private foundation literature is critical of private philanthropy 
conducting its affairs as an unchecked, but powerful secret society. Concerns expressed 
about a lack of transparency and disparate power among private foundations seem 
understandable given that they have private control over large sums of tax-advantaged 
funds. However, researchers have neither explored nor defined the nature of opaqueness 
in private philanthropy. The privacy and transparency literature suggests that 
transparency can impose additional costs, impede productivity and stymie innovation. 
This research resulted in a deeper understanding of the nature of opaque foundation 
practices, discovered that opacity can result in beneficial outcomes and identified 
strategies foundations and grantees successfully use in overcoming challenges related to 
opacity and coexisting disparate power.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Calls for greater corporate transparency have gained momentum especially since the 
2008 global financial crisis (Kelly 2009). Transparency is believed to reduce potential for 
unethical behavior and misconduct (Jennings, Mitchell, Hannah, 2014, Morrison & Mujtaba, 
2010). Interest in accountability and transparency in corporations and social institutions seems to 
prompt a belief that greater transparency can reduce potential for wrong doing and seems a 
legitimate notion at least on the surface. Despite outcries for greater transparency in corporations 
and social institutions, it is important to note that transparency is not achieved without cost 
(Hannan, Polos, Carroll, 2003). Costs of transparency can include lost efficiencies, lower 
productivity and inability to maintain appropriate confidentiality (Osborne 2004). Further, efforts 
to achieve transparency can result in additional expenditures (Hannan, Polos, Carroll, 2003), 
internal distractions (Briscoe & Murphy, 2012) and loss of internal candor (Desai 2011).     
At some level, the public’s right to know about corporate/social institution practices can 
conflict with important privacy considerations such as the need to protect competitive 
advantages/technology, manage confidentiality and pursue potential opportunities to innovate 
(Osborne 2004). Opaque practices in corporations and social institutions can impede external 
transparency, but at the same time they may contribute to efficiency, productivity and innovation 
(Briscoe & Murphy 2012, Dowie 2001).  
Private philanthropy in the United States represents a useful sector for studying issues 
related to transparency. It is a social institution that has been observed to conduct itself in a 
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fashion viewed to be especially non-transparent/opaque to interested outsiders (Sandy 2007, 
Fleishman 2007, Ostrander 2007). Therefore, it is an interesting setting in which to explore the 
nature of non-transparent/opaque practices. Further, since private philanthropy exists entirely for 
societal benefit, it also provides a unique opportunity to explore how public benefits may derive 
from opaque circumstances.          
Private philanthropy is an insider-dominated institution exercising control over vast sums 
of tax-advantaged funds (Fleishman 2007, Sandy 2007, Ostrander 2007). Tax law permits 
wealthy donors to avoid inheritance taxes in exchange for contributing funds to create private 
foundations that may then only be utilized for charitable purposes (Silk & Lintott, 2002). Private 
control over tax-advantaged funds has prompted calls for greater transparency (Sandy 2007, Leat 
2006).  
Gap in Literature 
 Private philanthropy in the United States is a relatively new institution (Fleishman 2007). 
Many have observed the opaque character of private philanthropy and have called for greater 
transparency for interested outsiders within this emerging field (Sandy 2007, Ostrander 2007, 
Fleishman 2007, Leat 2006). Some authors have concluded that private philanthropy conducts its 
affairs in a manner that is both mysterious and unaccountable to interested outsiders (Sandy 
2007). According to Sandy (2007), American private foundations are among the least 
accountable social institutions. Yet, the literature does not explore whether the opaqueness of 
private philanthropy may actually result in benefits to society. 
This research is intended to probe the opacity of private philanthropy to a deeper extent 
than present in existing literature in two important regards. First, while the literature observes the 
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opaque character of private philanthropy, it does not explore or define the nature of such opacity. 
Second, the literature does not consider the possibility of public benefits that may result from the 
private management of tax-advantaged funds. Dowie (2001) suggests that the public’s interest 
may be especially well served by charity performed within a private context. The privacy 
literature also suggests that transparency should not be considered a panacea (Briscoe & Murphy, 
2013, Bernstein, 2012, Desai, 2011, Osborne, 2004, Hannan, Polos, Carroll, 2003). 
This research investigated opacity in private philanthropy. More specifically, this was an 
investigation of the existence and nature of opacity and a coexisting imbalance of power between 
foundations and grantees, factors influencing opaque practices, potential relationship between 
opacity and innovation/philanthropic outcomes and any strategies foundations-grantees have 
developed in overcoming challenges related to opacity and power imbalances. The purpose of 
this research is to add new knowledge to the literature.   
This research addresses four essential concerns. First, it probes whether opacity actually 
exists in private philanthropy. Second, if so, it explores organizational/environmental factors that 
seem to encourage/reinforce opacity. Third, it seeks to understand both negative and positive 
effects of opacity.  Fourth, this research sought to uncover strategies, developed by foundations 
and/or grantees to overcome challenging consequences of opacity and a coexisting imbalance of 
power between foundations and grantees. 
Why Researching Opacity in Private Philanthropy is Important 
While there is considerable evidence that private foundations in the U.S. have contributed 
significantly to the public good (Anheier & Leat 2013, Fleishman 2007), many have expressed 
concern about the extent of tax-advantaged assets that exist under the control of opaque, largely 
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unaccountable, privately controlled entities (Fleishman 2007, Sandy 2007, Ostrander 2007, Leat 
2006). Further, concerns regarding opaque foundation practices in the literature seem to ignore 
potential benefits derived from conducting philanthropy in private settings. This dissertation took 
a unique approach to opacity, exploring potential consequences and the culture of autonomy in 
which private philanthropy is practiced.     
In 2012, private philanthropy in the U.S. collectively possessed and controlled 
approximately $584 billion in tax-advantaged funds. The growth of private philanthropy over the 
past few decades has been significant (Gardner 1992).  In fact, the assets of all U.S. private 
foundations, in aggregate, would rank twentieth compared to the gross domestic product among 
235 nations (Rimel 2001).   
Private foundations account for approximately 82% of the assets under the control of all 
categories of foundations in the U.S. The combined financial assets of all categories of U.S. 
foundations in 2012 were approximately $715.5 billion (Foundation Center 2012). Private 
foundations distribute approximately 5% of their assets to public charities annually (Diller 1993).  
In 2012, U.S. private foundations contributed approximately $35.4 billion to nonprofits through 
grants (http://data.foundationcenter.org/#/foundations/all/nationwide/total/list/2012). The field of 
private philanthropy represents a sector of consequence and scale. The scale of the field merits 
the inquiry on which this dissertation is based.    
 There are several reasons why this research is needed. First, this sector controls vast sums 
of tax-advantaged funds in which the public seems to have a legitimate interest (Fleishman 
2007). Second, government has traditionally been the largest supporter of nonprofit 
organizations. In the past two decades, government has significantly reduced its financial support 
for nonprofits (Kerlin & Pollack, 2011). At the same time, support for nonprofits from private 
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philanthropy in the United States has grown substantially and is becoming an increasingly more 
important source of nonprofit support (Kerlin & Pollack, 2011). Third, private foundations may 
be willing to experiment with new, unproven and innovative programs that traditional 
governmental funding agencies would see as too controversial or risky. Consequently, private 
foundations may be in a better position to support innovation given that they are less subject to 
public scrutiny (Dowie 2001). With respect to this point, understanding the role of opacity 
relative to potential innovation becomes important. Findings from a better understanding of 
factors contributing to, as well as potential benefits of, organizational opacity can be 
transferrable to other domains.  
Application of Theory 
 The private foundation literature suggests that both internal and external influences may 
combine to reinforce opaque practices within private foundations. They may represent very 
different theoretical contexts, but seem complimentary in their effects on opacity. These internal 
and external influences seemingly combine to encourage opacity within private philanthropy.  
Of particular interest are possible consequences and benefits of opaque practices, why 
foundation insiders may feel entitled to operate in opaque ways and why some outsiders seem to 
defer to insider privacy/discretion within philanthropy. Accordingly, two theories are drawn 
upon to provide a more comprehensive explanation of the subject of this research, one focusing 
on internal and another on external influences. 
 In explaining internal influences on opacity in private foundations, focus is intentionally 
targeted on why foundation insiders may believe they are inherently entitled to conduct 
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themselves in a manner that seems externally unaccountable (Sandy 2007). Moral Licensing 
Theory (MLT) may be helpful in explaining such internal influences (Klotz & Bolino, 2013).  
MLT correlates self-perception of the nobility of motivation and worthiness of pursuit to 
resulting expectations of special accommodation with regard to subsequent conduct (Klotz & 
Bolino 2013, Branas-Garza, Bucheli, Espinosa, Garcia-Munoz, 2011, Greene & Low, 2014). It is 
a subconscious process in which one seeks a moral balance, adjusting behavior consistent with 
one’s view of prior actions (Jennings, Mitchell, Hannah, 2014). MLT is believed to be even more 
likely to occur in autonomous, ambiguous settings (Greene & Low, 2014). The charitable intent 
of private philanthropy combined with its autonomous nature would seem to give rise to MLT 
entitled behavior. 
Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) is employed to explain why interested outsiders are 
deferential with respect to opaque practices of private philanthropy. At a minimum, interested 
outsiders would include the government, nonprofit grantees and society. According to RDT, 
when party A to a transaction is dependent upon the resources of party B, party A will need to 
defer to, and comply with, terms imposed by party B (Drees & Heugens, 2013, Pfeffer & 
Sakancik, 1978). Private foundations are entirely self-funded and exist to provide financial 
resources for the benefit of interested outsiders. Thus, foundations will have more power than 
interested outsiders, giving rise to the ability to engage in opaque practices.   
According to Drees & Heugens (2013), organizations naturally seek to enhance their 
autonomy. They are inclined to become more autonomous in reducing possible intrusions by 
external entities and when optimizing internal productivity, efficiency and even innovation. RDT 
can help explain how organizations achieve greater autonomy by reducing their external 
dependence and/or expanding the dependence of others on them.   
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 While MLT and RDT are useful in exploring internal and external influences of opacity 
within private philanthropy, neither seems sufficient in achieving a more complete understanding 
of the phenomenon of opacity in private philanthropy. This research will consider possible 
application of grounded theory in an effort to achieve a more complete understanding of 
foundation behaviors related to opacity.    
Research Questions 
This study sought to develop a better understanding of the opaque nature of private 
foundation practices and a coexisting imbalance of power between foundations and grantees. 
This research was guided by the following questions: 
Research Questions: 
1. Does opacity exist in private philanthropy? 
2. What organizational/environmental factors seem to lead to opacity? 
3. Presuming that foundations engage in opaque practices, what are the positive 
and/or negative effects of such opacity?   
4. Have foundations and/or grantees developed strategies for overcoming challenges 
related to opacity and imbalances of power? 
A better understanding of the nature and consequences of opaque practices in private 
philanthropy could be useful to private foundation practitioners in developing strategies to 
enhance the effectiveness of their interactions with interested outsiders. Further, awareness of 
potential benefits of private foundation practices could help guide policy development related to 
opacity. According to Fleishman (2007), if private foundations fail to sufficiently address 
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concerns about their opaque practices, disruptive legislation could result. Further, developing an 
understanding of potential benefits of private foundation opacity can help foundations, grantees 
and public policymakers better understand potential advantages related the autonomous nature of 
private foundations.   
Background on Private Philanthropy in the United States 
When referring to private philanthropy, focus is intentionally directed to private 
foundations, by contrast to other categories of foundations (i.e., community, corporate, and 
public) and/or public charitable enterprises. With the advent of special advantages in U.S. tax 
law, private philanthropy has emerged from generous, often large, one-time contributions (Silk 
& Lintott, 2002). As self-perpetuating institutions, private foundations do not depend upon 
subsequent fundraising to support their activities, and therefore, are not as externally focused as 
other types of foundations/charities. This seems, at least partially, explained by RDT. The theory 
suggests that external orientation, and corresponding transparency is enhanced to the extent an 
entity is resource dependent upon external parties.  
Once formed, private foundations are managed as endowed entities. Assets are grown 
through investments (Silk & Lintott, 2002) rather than fundraising activities. Private foundations, 
therefore, typically have singular contributors, lack external stakeholders and enjoy considerable 
discretion and autonomy under U.S. tax laws (Ostrander 2007). Private foundations are resource 
providers rather than resource seekers. Accordingly, private foundations are often positioned as 
the more powerful, dominant partner in their interactions with resource dependent outsiders, 
including grantees (Francisco & Shui-Yan, 2007), which would seem to mute potential 
stakeholder status of grantees. 
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Private foundations represent a segment of the nonprofit, social benefit community 
known as the third sector, which is often thought to support essential services in a space that 
exists between the government and the private sector (Bubb 2010). From a historical perspective, 
private philanthropy is a relatively recent development in U.S. public policy (Gardner 1992), 
generally thought to have been formally in existence just over a century.  
While foundations already manage enormous sums of tax-advantaged assets, Stimpson 
(2001) points out that an unprecedented $25 trillion is expected to go to U.S. based charities over 
the next half century as a result of an expected transfer of wealth from the baby boomer 
generation. Private foundations have become an increasingly popular vehicle for facilitating 
philanthropic giving. This forecast of intergenerational transfer of wealth is likely to grow 
private philanthropy beyond anything previously experienced, giving further support to the 
importance of this research. The prediction for significant growth in private philanthropy only 
serves to make this research even more important. 
Definitions 
In this research, definitions are needed for transparency, opacity, inter-organizational 
power imbalance, resource dependence and foundation insiders/outsiders. Each of the definitions 
employed in this research is provided as follows: 
Transparency: According to Osborne (2004), transparency is defined as “helping people 
to see into systems and understand why decisions are taken.” Opacity is the antithesis of 
transparency.  
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Opacity: For the purposes of this research, opacity is defined as a practice or conduct 
(whether intended or unintended), which systematically reduces transparency between 
organizational insiders and outside stakeholders. 
Power Imbalance: Casciaro and Piskaski (2005) define power imbalance as “the 
difference in the power of each actor over the other.”  When power is vastly disparate between 
partnering entities, an imbalance of power is thought to exist. 
Resource Dependence: Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) define resource dependence as “the 
extent to which a focal organization depends on resources controlled by nominally independent 
parties in its environment.” 
Interested Outsiders: Hodge and Piccolo (2011) define parties with legitimate interests in 
private foundations as “government agencies, private donors, the media, clients of the 
organization, and the public at-large” (pg. 521). Interested outsiders are thought to be 
stakeholders in the sense of Hodge & Piccolo’s definition, but only those stakeholders that would 
be considered outsiders. This would principally include the government, nonprofit grantees and 
society. 
Foundation Principals/Insiders: Foundation principals/Insiders, under tax law, include 
donors, donor families, board members and key managers (Crimm 2013).  
Philanthropic Freedom: The Hudson Institute (2015) defined philanthropic freedom in 
terms of unimpeded ability to put private contributions to charitable purposes. For the purposes 
of this research, philanthropic freedom is defined as private foundation insider capacity to 
independently and without public accounting choose among charitable interests, make grants and 
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set grant terms, resist external and/or political pressures in grant decisions and avoid external 
accountability for grant outcomes.    
Research Model 
 This research was exploratory by design and focused on whether private philanthropy is 
opaque, organizational/environmental factors that can lead to opacity, negative and/or positive 
consequences of opacity and discovery of foundation/grantee strategies to overcome challenges 
related to opacity and a coexistent imbalance of power. Figure 1 illustrates the focus of this 
research. 
   Figure 1. Research Model 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The existence of private philanthropy is viewed by some as a voluntary form of wealth 
redistribution from the rich to the poor (Klassen & Fontaine, 1999). Others view private 
philanthropy as a vehicle to perpetuate what may be considered inappropriate private control 
over tax-advantaged funds by self-selected and self-perpetuating foundation insiders (Anheier & 
Leat, 2013). Some have suggested that private philanthropy has become so powerful that its 
opacity may actually result in an unchecked subversion of democratic processes (Barken 2013, 
Bulmer 1995), because the power represented by the assets they control can result is disparate 
capacity to influence public policy and/or opinion. Several authors have called for increased 
transparency and accountability by private foundations (Sandy 2007, Ostrander 2007, Fleishman 
2007, Leat 2006). 
Despite being created with expectations of mutual benefit for society and donors, the 
mysterious and highly autonomous nature of private foundations seems to result in conduct that 
is aloof toward outsiders (Ostrander 2007). Even grantees who work closely with foundations 
reportedly complain that they are unable to achieve appropriate levels of access to private 
foundations (Boldouc, Buchanan, Buteau, 2007, Ostrander 2007). Tuan (2004) suggests that this 
dynamic may lead to insular tendencies rather than motivating collaborative interactions between 
foundations and grantees. It has been suggested that problems arising from the autonomous 
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nature of private foundations may lead to elitism (Karl & Katz, 1987) toward, and inaccessibility 
for, the people and organizations who actually carry out the work supported by foundations 
(Boldouc, Buchanan, Buteau, 2007). 
Despite calls for greater transparency, the private foundation literature does not 
investigate why foundations are opaque entities. Nor does the literature consider whether opaque 
private foundation practices result in beneficial outcomes. It seems that both matters require 
greater study. Dowie (2001) suggests that foundations provide a uniquely beneficial private 
setting in which to conduct philanthropy resulting in solutions not likely to be achieved in public 
venues. However, Dowie did not study this possibility. 
In an effort to expand the narrative about transparency in private foundations, points of 
view outside the foundation literature were explored. Several findings raise questions regarding 
potential negative consequences from forced transparency. Bernstein (2012) warns against 
viewing transparency as a “panacea” and suggests that it can have “counterintuitive” effects on 
productivity. He warned that forced transparency can result in a “reverse Hawthorne effect” 
resulting in losses in efficiency and potential innovation. Osborne (2004) questioned potential 
benefits of transparency against corresponding increases in costs associated with facilitating 
transparency. Desai (2011) suggests that forced transparency may suppress internal candor, 
resulting in a loss of organizational learning and innovation. 
Internal Influences on Opacity and Moral Licensing Theory  
Private foundations seem correctly perceived as beneficial to society (Fleishman 2007).  
After all, they exist entirely for charitable purpose (Silk & Lintott, 2002).  This fact is not lost 
upon private foundation boards and staff (Tuan 2004). According to MLT (Klotz and Bolino, 
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2013, Merritt, Efron, Monin, 2010), when people engage in noble activities, they are inclined to 
subsequently afford themselves special rights and entitlement. One possible explanation for the 
perception of the opaque nature of private philanthropy is that their inherently good deeds entitle 
them to the privilege of managing their affairs in secrecy. In other words, the mere fact that one 
is engaged in charitable purpose may afford greater prerogative.  
Under federal regulations, private foundations may, but are not explicitly required to be 
highly transparent. For the most part, transparency with respect to decision making is voluntary 
for private foundations (Ostrander 2007, Leat 2006). This may contribute to private foundation 
boards and staff not experiencing the need to be externally accountable and may result in feeling 
justified in behaving in idiosyncratic and nontransparent ways (Boldouc, Buchanan, Buteau, 
2007). Given their inherently noble purpose, foundation insiders may permit themselves greater 
privilege in terms of their personal motives for creating foundations, who they select to serve as 
board members and the exercise of unilateral prerogatives with respect to the control they 
exercise over foundation resources.  
First, Greene and Low (2014) found that MLT is especially significant in private versus 
public settings and contexts. That is to say that one’s MLT entitled behavior is likely to be 
influenced by whether it is observable by others. People are inclined to want to be viewed 
favorably, and are more likely to behave positively when visible to others (Greene & Low, 
2014). The implication is that MLT in opaque settings may be more self-perpetuating than in 
more transparent circumstances. Private philanthropy exists within an especially autonomous 
state (Fleishman 2007, Ostrander 2007), a context in which MLT is more likely to occur (Merritt, 
Efron, Monin, 2010). Accordingly MLT, under such circumstances, is likely to result in greater 
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entitlement by principals, which may assume the form of less transparency and accountability 
with respect to the management of tax-advantaged funds (Sandy 2007). 
 Second, Jennings, Mitchell and Hannah (2014) found that MLT entitled behavior can 
derive from more than perceptions of one’s prior conduct (“doing”). The reference to “doing” 
means entitlement is based upon perceptions of one’s conduct. They also observed that MLT can 
be motivated by one’s view of their relational circumstances (“having”). In this context, 
“having” has to do with one’s association with an organization, group, entity that is viewed as 
being noble. The idea is that one derives entitlement from mere association with persons and/or 
organizations perceived as engaging in good and noble activity. In the case of private 
philanthropy, it’s possible that the mere association with an organization that does good things 
can be sufficient to merit MLT entitled behavior. Tuan (2004) observed that foundation 
personnel occasionally act as if grants made by their employers actually were funded by them 
personally. She referred to this as an issue of “proximity” to foundation resources resulting in one 
thinking such resources are his/her virtual personal property. 
 Third, MLT seems to provide useful insights into internally-generated entitlement to 
opaque-related conduct, but it falls short of explaining external influences on opacity. External 
influences are derived from deferential attitudes of interested outsiders (Tuan 2004). In 
considering such external influences, attention is given to why interested outsiders would seem 
to cooperate in subordinating their presumed interest in tax-advantaged funds managed by 
foundations (Francisco & Shui-Yan, 2007). This could include the government which foregoes 
tax revenue in exchange for the creation of private foundations (Silk & Lintott, 2002), nonprofit 
organizations who are intended recipients of foundation grants (Boldouc, Buchanan, Buteau, 
2007) and beneficiaries of the services of such nonprofit organizations (Fleishman 2007), 
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collectively considered interested outsiders within the context of private philanthropy (Ostrander 
2007, Leat 2006).  
Fourth, organizational owners or principals are generally thought to be the rightful parties 
to control the destiny of their organizations (Bryant & Davis, 2012). Like private business, the 
success or failure of private foundations is vested in the control of the organization. This may 
lead private foundation insiders to viewing themselves as the rightful heirs of foundation legacy. 
This would seem to reinforce the notion of rightful control, which is further amplified by the fact 
that the majority of private foundations are family foundations – often governed and controlled 
by board members who are typically comprised of family members of the original donor.  
Communities served by family foundations may experience difficulty in distinguishing between 
the foundation and its corresponding family (Tuan 2004). Foundation grants may be viewed as 
family gifts rather than institutional grants.   
There is evidence in the literature that the insular, opaque nature of private foundations 
results in inaccessibility, arising from an absence of perceived need to be externally accountable 
to interested outsiders (Boldouc, Buchanan, Buteau, 2007, Ostrander 2007, Leat 2006, Tuan 
2004). Further the apparent significance of troubled relations with grantees (Boldouc, Buchanan, 
Buteau, 2007) suggests that the importance of key outsiders is not sufficiently recognized by 
foundations or that private foundation boards fail to sufficiently integrate outsider concerns into 
their decision-making process.  
The opaque nature of private foundations may, in itself, represent evidence that the 
influence of interested outsiders has too often been muted, which could result in 
disproportionately greater emphasis on internal interests and concerns (Boldouc, Buchanan, 
Buteau, 2007). This can contribute to explaining reported inaccessible, dismissive and rude 
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foundation behavior as viewed by grantees. Further, foundation insiders may be able to self-
justify their lack of transparency and accountability, because they have engaged in noble 
activities.       
External Influences on Opacity and Resource Dependence Theory 
The resource dependent nature of many outsiders to private philanthropy can also shape 
internal and external influences that contribute to opaque foundation practices, as shown in 
Figure 1. Five such influences thought to contribute to opacity in private philanthropy include 
effects of competing motivations for creating foundations, self-appointed boards, effects of 
disparate power, effects of limited regulation and confusion about functional ownership of 
foundation assets.  
In the case of private foundations, outsiders seem especially deferential in delegating 
control over tax-advantaged funds through seemingly pronounced tolerance of non-transparency 
and lacking public accountability. It is possible that interested outsiders may be so focused on 
potential benefits to society of the resources derived from the creation of private foundations that 
their resource seeking objectives serve to subordinate possible expectations regarding 
transparency and accountability (Tuan 2004). For this reason, RDT (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) is 
drawn upon to help explain external influences on opaque foundation practices.  
Power is directly related to the extent to which one is dependent upon another for needed 
resources (Casciaro & Piskarski, 2005). The less dependent an organization is upon external 
entities for essential resources, the more autonomous/powerful it can be (Drees & Hengens, 
2013). The more dependent upon the resources of others, the less autonomous/powerful one is in 
such interactions (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
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In the case of foundation donors, and subsequently other foundation insiders, the 
attraction of foundation resources by the government, nonprofit agencies and society may 
subordinate them to and embolden the autonomous nature of private foundations consistent with 
RDT. Observations throughout the private foundation literature suggest that the macro 
environment and internal practices of private philanthropy accommodate considerable autonomy. 
A mismatch in power has been observed between foundations and external parties 
(Boldouc, Buchanan and Buteau, 2007 Francisco & Shui-Yan, 2007). According to RDT, power 
shifts in relationships between interacting parties as one party becomes dependent upon the 
resources of another (Francisco & Shui-Yan, 2007). Private foundations are born out of a 
resource producing event and are subsequently intended to be resource providing entities (Silk & 
Lintott, 2002). Given that private foundations are, therefore, sources of financial resource, 
outsiders are typically attracted to interact with private foundations with the expectation of 
soliciting grants (Tuan 2004).    
RDT posits that resource seeking organizations have greater external focus and deference 
(Bryant & Davis 2012).  When an organization is resource dependent, that is dependent upon 
resources from one or more external parties, it tends to be more heavily focused on how 
accountability is externally defined and measured (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Organizational 
relevance and efficacy becomes externally focused. Private foundations are endowed 
organizations. As such, they exist to provide financial resources to entities which need such 
resources, and therefore, need not be externally focused or accountable. This automatically 
results in an imbalance of power between foundations and resource dependent outsiders, 
especially grantees (Francisco & Shui-Yan, 2007).    
The Opacity of Private Philanthropy 
 
 
19 
 
The non-resource dependent circumstance of private foundations can further isolate and 
turn inward the focus of their boards, executive leadership and staff (Fleishman 2007, Leat 
2006). In other words, if they do not need to seek external support, foundations may not perceive 
themselves as needing to be responsive to interested outsiders. Given their resource intense 
circumstance, accountability is more typically imposed by, not on, funders (Leat 2006).  Despite 
the insulating effects of RDT, the tax-advantaged status of foundations may eventually expose 
them to calls for greater external accountability (Fleishman 2007). It was suggested that private 
foundations should proactive in becoming more transparent to avoid potential unfriendly 
legislation imposing transparency requirements.      
Organizational Opacity and its Underlying Tenets of Entitlement and Resource Imbalance 
 Figure 2 is a force field analysis showing the combining of internal and external 
influences related to five factors thought to contribute to the opaque nature of private 
foundations. It shows the interrelationships between internal and external influences on these 
five factors thought to support opacity. A traditional force field analysis (adopted from Kurt 
Lewin's force field theory) displays forces for and against a given phenomenon or occurrence.  
In the case of opaque philanthropy, there appears to be a confluence of internal and 
external influences that jointly perpetuate opacity. Figure 2 illustrates several internal and 
external influences that seem to jointly support philanthropy. There is some debate about 
whether private foundations exist within the public sphere. While they are entirely created by 
private contributions, they are subsequently composed of tax-advantaged funds, subject to 
legislative mandates.  
As such, foundations manage quasi-public funds and their opaque practices can only exist 
with both internal and external license. However, these influences are not the primary focus of 
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this research. They are, nevertheless, important in understanding the nature of opaque private 
foundation practices. Further, they provide an important context in which to build theory 
accordingly.  
 
Figure 2. Force Field Analysis 
 
 
 
The following sections provide a summary description of how the five factors shown above 
(competing motives for creating foundations, self-appointed/sustained boards, disparate power, 
limited regulation and confused ownership) are influenced by internal and external attitudes 
about private foundations and how they contribute to opaque foundation practices.  While these 
factors will not be empirically tested in this research, they are useful in the interpretative 
exploration of the nature of opaque private foundation practice. 
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Competing Motives for Creating Private Foundations 
Consistent with MLT, founders may entertain a variety of motives for creating private 
foundations, some of which are in addition to, and may to some extent compete with, charitable 
aims. Motives for creating foundations are likely to reflect the values of donors, which can affect 
the manner in which foundation insiders subsequently, conduct themselves. According to 
Anheier and Leat (2012), there are four distinct reasons for creating foundations including 
values-based motivations, instrumental motivations, peer pressure and self-serving motives. The 
following more fully describes each of these reasons for creating a foundation: 
1. Values-Based Motivations: Some private foundations are created entirely for the 
purpose of pursuing charitable interests (Klassen & Fontaine, 1999) as opposed to 
self-serving objectives. Such motivation would seem to be correlated to genuine 
charitable purpose. This motivation may reduce MLT entitled conduct.  
2. Instrumental Motivations: Instrumental motivations often have more to do with 
personal/business objectives rather than charitable intent. This might include tax 
avoidance or dynastic motivations. Inheritance taxes can be avoided by contributing 
assets from family estates to private foundations (Ellwanger & Gassman 2010, 
Schnall, 2008). When competing motives are not principally charitable, MLT 
suggests that conduct is more likely to be entitled.  
3. Peer Pressure: This might include social pressures from peers to establish institutional 
philanthropy as a way of “keeping up with the Jones.” This motive may serve 
individual egos rather than genuine philanthropic intent. Competitive drive and/or ego 
enhancement is expected to give rise to MLT entitlement (Freeman 1984). 
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4. Selfish Motives: This might involve intent to perpetuate control over assets for 
personal gratification. Donors appoint self-perpetuating boards (Bolton & Mehran, 
2006, Karl & Katz, 1987), often comprised of insiders. This context seems more 
likely to provoke MLT entitled behavior.   
 
Motives for establishing foundations can impose strong influences on the culture and 
nature of foundations (Anheier and Leat, 2012), especially due to the existence of only modest 
legal and regulatory requirements to which foundations must account. The circumstances 
underlying the motivation for creating foundations can be complex and highly variable.  This 
would seem to suggest potential for significant variation in opaque orientations. 
Like many firms, internal influences, including the interests and concerns of founders, 
often shape preferences with respect to organizational culture and governance (Adams, 
Hermalin, Weisman, 2010). Motives based upon instrumental objectives, peer-pressure or selfish 
tendencies can influence insider-oriented activity, because they emphasize unilateral interests. In 
doing so, they can also influence the manner in which interested outsiders are recognized and 
treated (Ostrander 2007, Leat 2006). 
Self-Appointed/Sustaining Boards 
A significant contributing factor to the opacity of private foundations is thought to be the 
self-appointed, self-sustaining and highly autonomous nature of foundation boards (Bolton & 
Mehran, 2006). Foundation boards are not required to have open meetings or publicly disclose 
decisions made. Private foundations are often perceived as exclusive, mysterious, opaque and 
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insular entities in the eyes of external parties (Ostrander 2007, Hill & Jones, 1992). Insider 
boards can contribute to a climate correlated with high levels of internal autonomy.  
Contributing to the presumed privilege of the “private” status of philanthropy is the 
considerable latitude afforded private foundations under tax law (Sandy 2007, Fleishman 2007). 
Foundations are not required to appoint board members who meet specific qualifications or who 
are representative of interested outsiders (Stone & Ostrower, 2007). As a result, many private 
foundation boards are comprised of board members who are family members, business 
associates, or friends of donors – mostly insiders (Bolton & Mehran, 2006).  
Disparate Power 
The resource dependent status of grantees serves to subordinate them relative to 
foundations consistent with the tenants of RDT (Francisco & Shui-Yan, 2007).  Grantees report 
that foundations treat them in disrespectful ways, failing to acknowledge the value grantees 
represent (Boldouc, Buchanan, Buteau, 2007, Ostrander 2007, Leat 2005, Tuan 2004).  Based 
upon findings in the literature, it seems the only recourse grantees may have is to seek funding 
from sources other than private foundations. The absence of power symmetry in relations 
between foundations and interested outsiders can impede the effectiveness of foundation 
collaboration (Porter & Kramer, 2009, Fairfield & Wing, 2008). 
Limited Regulation 
In the U.S., private foundations are classified as private, rather than public charities 
(Fernandez & Hager, 2014).  As such, they are subject to unique regulations and laws. Yet, legal 
requirements imposed on private foundations seem relatively lax for organizations that manage 
vast sums of tax-advantaged money. While other kinds of foundations may be subject to greater 
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legislative and regulative control, the government has elected to impose upon private foundations 
very little control or requirement for external accountability (Ostrander 2007). Some have 
implied that such relatively limited regulations may further embolden foundation insiders to view 
themselves as principals rather than fiduciaries (Ostrander 2007, Leat 2006).  
Foundations are created under federal law (Silk & Lintott, 2002), but federal regulations do 
not significantly influence foundation grant making discretion or transparency. Federal 
regulation is limited as much regulation and enforcement is delegated to state government 
(Bulmer 1995). The paucity of federal regulations on private foundations may encourage the 
private nature of such entities (Ostrander 2007, Sandy 2007, Fleishman 2007). In support of 
claims of limited regulation of private foundations, the following is a list of the most significant 
regulations imposed on private foundations: 
1. Required Distributions: According to Diller (1993) private foundations must make 
minimal annual charitable contributions (generally about 5% of their total assets). 
Despite this required distribution level, foundations have shown they can continue to 
grow their endowments (Sansing & Yetman, 2006).    
2. Restricted Use of Charitable Funds: All contributions made by private foundations 
must be explicitly for charitable purposes and/or made to qualified grantees 
(Ellwanger & Gassman, 2010). Any governmental unit, 501(c)(3) public charity, or 
church can receive foundation grants. Foundations are not required to issue requests 
for proposals nor are they required to possess, or disclose, criteria for grant decisions. 
3. Oversight of Investment Activity: Federal law requires foundations to be generally 
“prudent” when investing charitable assets (Silk & Lintott, 2002).  
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4. Self-Dealing: Foundations are prohibited from acts of self-dealing – using foundation 
assets for the benefit of “disqualified persons” - generally interpreted as donors, 
donor families, board members and key foundation personnel and/or outside entities 
in which any of the aforementioned have financial interests (Crimm 2013). 
5. Annual Tax Returns:  Private foundations are only required to disclose their assets, 
board members and management, compensation for disqualified persons, investment 
gains and grant activity through annual federal tax returns (Silk & Lintott, 2002).  
The aforementioned forms of external regulation may seem, on the surface, to be 
meaningful and in some ways they may be. However, none of the regulations described erode the 
power afforded foundation insiders, which can result in insular, self-serving practices.  
According to Bulmer (1995), federal and state governments tend to view private foundations as 
“intermediaries” between the government and grantees, and accordingly, tend to leave much 
discretion to private foundations within the bounds of their charitable activity. 
Confusion Regarding Ownership 
According to Monks and Minow (2011), personal property is defined by three distinct 
characteristics. First, an owner has the ability to utilize personal property in a fashion he/she 
desires.  Second, an owner can unilaterally control use of personal property by others.  Third, an 
owner is free to transfer ownership to another party.  Foundations have relatively untethered 
ability to use their assets for any qualified charitable purpose, they can unilaterally control use of 
foundation funds by grantees, and routinely transfer assets to nonprofit organizations. Such 
capacities may cause foundation insiders and interested outsiders to view foundation assets as 
functionally owned and controlled by foundation insiders, resulting in corresponding deference 
to internal interests (Bulmer 1995). 
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Potential Benefits Related to the Opaque Nature of Private Philanthropy 
Contrary to calls for greater transparency in private philanthropy, it has been suggested 
that an atmosphere that does not over-emphasize external accountability may encourage greater 
willingness to engage in risk while pursuing innovation (Katz 2005). Therefore, an absence of 
public accountability may obviate potential for risk aversion, resulting in a culture of willingness 
to experiment without fear of consequences of failure in the public eye (Dowie 2001). Karl and 
Katz (1981) actually challenge the notion that the private nature of philanthropy (e.g. lack of 
public transparency) somehow equates with deceptiveness. They dispute the idea that the non-
public nature of private philanthropy is actually a bad thing, per se. 
Arguments in Favor of and Against Imposed Transparency  
The foundation literature consistently calls for greater transparency in private 
philanthropy. However, authors outside of philanthropic literature caution against unmitigated 
enthusiasm about transparency. This section will synthesize arguments discovered in the 
literature for and against the imposition of greater transparency.  
It has been suggested that private settings may actually provide a uniquely ideal context 
in which to stimulate innovation, bringing private sector solutions to public problems (Dowie 
2001). Briscoe and Murphy (2012) suggest that transparency may actually impede innovation in 
favor of greater risk aversion. Hannan, Polos, and Carroll (2003) have suggested that bounded 
rationality about the merits of transparency may impede appropriate calculation of resulting costs 
and benefits. Further, Osborne (2004) warns that transparency may result in additional costs that 
can divert resources from important charitable purposes.  Transparency is not a cost-free 
objective.  Organizations must bear additional expenses to achieve transparency.  
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Analysis of pros and cons of imposed transparency would not be complete without 
considering the merits of residual rights of privacy by foundation insiders (Osbourne 2004). It is 
important to consider that funds held by private foundations were received through private 
donations with the understanding that residual rights of control are contemplated and provided 
for under tax law (Silk & Lintott, 2002).      
However, others have argued that greater transparency and external accountability are 
needed to prevent insiders from treating foundation assets as virtual personal property for the 
purpose of self-aggrandizement rather than genuine charitable intent (Ostrander 2007). Further, 
they suggest that private foundations should be required to publicly share results and lessons 
learned from their charitable activities for the benefit of society (Leat 2006). Fernandez and 
Hager (2014) note marked differences in this regard between private and public foundations.  
Public foundations (including community foundations) typically have to continuously 
fundraise, making them more resource dependent and more externally accountable. Private 
foundations have a very different circumstance in that they are not externally resource 
dependent. Some have suggested that foundation boards should be required to have more 
independent members to assure greater external accountability (Wang & Coffey, 1992).  
As part of their grant activity, private foundations may be able to avoid risk-aversion 
when providing capital for the third sector in support of experimental initiatives and testing of 
new innovations. This may involve support for university-based research (Katz 2005) or 
innovative new ideas to be implemented by grantee organizations (Kania & Kramer, 2011). The 
idea here is that non-resource dependent organizations with little or no meaningful public 
accountability may more freely embrace risk in their grant making activities.  
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Concerns about opaque foundation practices expressed in the literature (Ostrander 2007, 
Sandy, 2007, Leat 2006) seem to imply a colossal failure of public policy to require sufficient 
transparency for the purposes of protecting the public’s interest in the assets they control. An 
alternate view might be that the autonomous nature of private foundations may interject 
opportunities for entrepreneurial management of tax-advantaged funds (Dowie 2001). It is 
possible that the practice of private philanthropy outside the watchful eye of society/government 
creates an environment to embrace greater risk, be more creative and innovate in addressing 
many pressing societal problems. Transparency and greater accountability could result in more 
risk-averse grant making activity (Katz 2005), compromising potential for creativity and 
innovation as a result of concerns regarding adverse public reaction to potential failure (Dowie 
2001).  
Several authors have warned about untoward effects of imposed transparency on 
organizations (Briscoe & Murphy, 2013, Desai, 2011, Osborne, 2004, Hannan, Polos, Carroll, 
2003).  They raise concern about added costs, lost productivity/innovation, depressed internal 
candor and many other concerns about undesirable effects of imposed transparency. There is a 
striking contrast of position on the matter of transparency between these authors and the private 
foundation literature. Such differences are unlikely to be successfully resolved without a better 
understanding of factors that contribute to opacity and exploration of potential for unintended 
benefits from such.  
Summary 
The literature observes that private philanthropy in the United States is opaque to 
outsiders (Fleishman 2007, Ostrander 2007, Sandy 2007, Leat 2006). Several of these 
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researchers have called for greater transparency within private foundations, suggesting that the 
autonomous nature of the field is problematic (Sandy 2007, Fleishman 2007, Ostrander 2007). 
However, several authors outside of the private foundation literature warn about potential 
untoward effects of imposed transparency (Briscoe & Murphy, 2012, Desai 2011, Osborne 2004, 
Hannan, Polos, Carroll, 2003). Based upon findings in the literature, it seems that certain factors, 
internally and externally generated, contribute to a state of opacity in private philanthropy. 
Further, the resource-intense nature of private foundations and the resource dependent status of 
grantees contribute to an imbalance of power between foundations and grantees (Francisco & 
Shui-Yan, 2007). Disparate power between foundations and grantees may be further complicated 
by opaque foundation practices that contribute to the mystique of private foundations (Ostrander 
2007, Leat 2006).  
MLT was used to help explain internally generated factors contributing to opaque 
conditions. Internal factors appear to derive from self-licensing related to entitled attitudes of 
privacy resulting from the private source of contributed capital, insider control, disparate power 
over external parties, nobility associated with charitable activity and confusion about functional 
ownership of foundation funds (Greene & Low, 2014, Klotz & Bolino, 2013, Branas-Garza, 
Bucheli, Espinosa, Garcia-Munoz, 2011). Foundation insiders are expected to express attitudes 
of entitlement regarding autonomous prerogatives in the management of foundation assets due 
the charitable nature of their mission (Klotz & Bolino, 2013) and private source of funds 
(Flieshman 2007, Ostrander 2007, Sandy 2007). 
RDT was employed in exploring externally generated factors. Such factors are thought to 
be associated with a high degree of deference enjoyed by private foundations with respect to 
interested outsiders. Such interested outsiders are often resource-seeking in their interactions 
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with private foundations, and therefore, inclined to comply with rather than challenge foundation 
activities. According to RDT, it is expected that interested outsiders will have the sense of their 
power being muted in their relationships with private foundations (Drees & Heugens, 2013, 
Pfeffer & Sakancik, 1978). 
Accordingly, outsiders seem to grant considerable deference to the autonomous nature of 
private philanthropy, accepting the right of foundation insiders to unilaterally manage tax-
advantaged funds with very little external accountability. Interested outsiders are expected to 
view foundation insiders (e.g., board and staff members) as powerful philanthropists, given their 
control over significant assets (Casciaro & Piskaski, 2005). Such outsiders are expected to be 
compliant with rather than challenge foundation requirements.           
This research considers organization/environmental factors that may lead to opacity. Five 
such factors are believed to support opacity in private philanthropy; they were probed in 
interviews with participants in an effort to gain perspectives into insider and interested outsider 
beliefs and experiences. 
With respect to competing motives for creating foundations, insiders are expected to view 
such as appropriate considerations as a condition precedent to making a considerable donation to 
a new private philanthropy (Anheier & Leat, 2013). By contrast, outsiders are expected to be 
unaware of the potential for such competing motives and express a lack of interest in the matter 
(Stone & Ostrower, 2007). 
Insiders are expected to view self-appointed/sustaining boards as an appropriate 
prerogative of the legacy of a private donor (Bolton & Mehran, 2006, Silk & Lintott, 2002). The 
prospect of perpetual control over the charitable activity following one’s contribution is expected 
to be seen as an appropriate incentive for creating a private foundation (Silk & Lintott, 2002). 
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Outsiders are expected to be confused about how board members are appointed, but not 
especially concerned. Outsiders are expected, however, to be interested in gaining more direct 
access to board members rather than merely foundation staff (Boldouc, Buchanan, Buteau, 
2007). 
Disparate power is not expected to be a significant concern to foundation insiders, but of 
greater concern to interested outsiders (Tuan 2004). Grantees are expected to express concern 
about how an imbalance of power between private foundations and them can mute grantee 
interests and concerns (Boldouc, Buchanan, Buteau, 2007, Casciaro & Piskaski, 2005).    
Insiders are expected to believe that regulations on private foundations are either 
appropriate or somewhat confining (Fleishman 2007). Outsiders are not expected to know much, 
or care, about regulations on private foundations, except as relates to transparency. Outsiders are 
expected to believe that the lack of transparency among private foundations impedes effective 
collaboration (Kania & Kramer, 2011).  
With respect to functional ownership rights of foundation assets, both insiders and 
outsiders are expected to view the private source of foundation assets (Silk & Lintott, 2002) and 
unilateral control over use of such assets (Monks & Minow, 2011) to be justification/evidence of 
private functional ownership of such assets. In other words, attitudes about the right to control 
use of private foundation assets, subject to the limits of law, are likely to align between insiders 
and outsiders. 
Lastly, foundation insiders are expected to believe that the autonomy/opacity of their 
existence allows for more innovative grant making, which may be in the public’s interests 
(Dowie 2001).  It is expected that insiders will view themselves as willing to experiment and 
take risks that can result in significant benefits for society. However, interested outsiders are 
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expected to cast doubt on the availability of private foundations to engage in the kind of 
collaboration needed to facilitate meaningful innovation (Kania & Kramer, 2011, Porter & 
Kramer, 2009, Leat 2006). Further, it is expected that foundation insiders will not be able to 
provide many examples of how they have shared lessons learned from their grant making with 
the broader foundation/nonprofit community (Fleishman 2007, Ostrander 2007, Leat 2006). 
Clearly, new research is needed to address the two aforementioned gaps in the literature. 
This is the focus of this research – exploration of nature of opacity in private foundations, its 
consequences (negative/positive) and the potential benefits of philanthropy performed in private 
contexts. However, it is important to note that not all private foundations possess uniform levels 
of opacity. Nor are they likely to be opaque or transparent in the same ways. 
Transparency is thought necessary to assure reliability of integrity, especially with 
respect to outsiders who may have a rightful claim regarding a firm. Yet, transparency is not 
necessarily the same as disclosure (Patel, Balic, Bwakira, 2002). Transparency has to do with 
being able to observe from outside an entity. Disclosure is a specific act intended to advise 
outsiders of a specific activity or circumstance (Buijze 2013). However, transparency and 
disclosure are intentional behaviors. When a foundation chooses not to be transparent or to 
disclose pertinent information, it is practicing opacity. 
While one dimension of opacity may be defined as a meaningful absence of transparency, 
the literature suggests that opacity is a form of practice in private philanthropy. The practice of 
opacity by private foundations suggests they do not view themselves as existing in the public 
sphere, and therefore, need not be externally accountable (Sandy 2007, Fleishman 2007, 
Ostrander 2007). A tension exists with respect to whether the private source of foundation capital 
(Silk & Lintott, 2002) entitles foundation insiders to high levels of autonomy or if its tax-
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advantaged circumstances of their existence (Fleishman 2007) demands greater external 
transparency.  
Given that the annual tax returns of private foundations are posted on certain websites, it 
might be inferred that they are reasonably transparent entities. However, tax returns are prepared 
well after the fiscal period they are intended to represent and are often publicly posted long after 
such returns have been filed. The result is that such information is not timely enough to 
meaningfully inform outsiders.  
Further, tax returns provide limited information regarding bases for grant/investment 
decisions. If foundations elect to share insights regarding how they decide between 
grant/investment options, such elections would constitute a voluntary act of disclosure (Patel, 
Balic, Bwakira, 2002). This would be voluntary, because doing such is not required of private 
foundations (Sandy 2007).  
In addition to the matter of elective disclosure, foundations are not likely to be universal 
with respect to their levels of transparency. Liedorp, Musch, Cruijsen, De Haan (2013) 
distinguish between political and procedural transparency – the former being externally imposed 
upon an entity (required compliance) and the latter representing an elective effort (voluntary) to 
equip outsiders with greater insight regarding internal practices and decision making.  
Given that, in the case of private philanthropy, such disclosure would be entirely 
voluntary, procedural (voluntary) disclosure would seem to represent an intentional relaxation of 
their naturally opaque circumstances (Fleishman 2007). Some foundations may be more inclined 
to transparent conduct than others. 
The Opacity of Private Philanthropy 
 
 
34 
 
Questions remain as to whether private philanthropy engages in opaque practices, what 
organizational/environmental factors might encourage opacity, what negative and positive 
consequences arise from opacity and if foundations and grantees have developed strategies for 
overcoming challenges related to opacity and a coexisting imbalance of power. 
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Chapter 3: Methods 
Introduction 
 This research is primarily focused on two gaps in the private foundation literature. First, 
an exploration of private foundations opaque practices, including consideration of factors 
thought to contribute to opacity. Second, potential for societal benefits related to the opaque 
environment in which philanthropy is practiced is examined.  However, the primary focus of this 
research on private philanthropy is to develop a better understanding of (1) whether opacity 
actually exists in private philanthropy, (2) organizational/environmental factors that lead to 
opacity, (3) negative and positive consequences of opacity and (4) foundation/grantee strategies 
to overcome challenges of opacity and coexisting imbalance of power.  
Rationale for Using Qualitative Approach 
Based upon a review of available literature, it appears that some foundations are willing 
to participate in qualitative studies on condition of anonymity, but the field of private 
philanthropy does not appear to respond to survey-based research needed for quantitative 
analysis. The secretive nature of private foundations seems to have provided an impediment to 
scholarly investigation and empirical quantitative analysis of private philanthropy practices a 
priori.  
A virtual absence of empirical quantitative study of private philanthropy practices 
supports the notion that private philanthropy, as a field, is unavailable for empirical quantitative 
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research. Private foundations, however, have participated in case studies and oral histories 
(Leighninger 2013, Gibson 2013, Yolkov 2011, Ostrander 2007, Weiss 2000, Gardner 1992), 
suggesting that the field is available for qualitative research. Given the research questions 
underlying this dissertation require interpretive research, qualitative study seems especially 
appropriate for the purposes of this research.   
However, there were other important reasons for electing a qualitative approach for this 
research. A meaningful absence of prior research regarding opacity prompts a need for an 
exploratory approach in investigating the research questions previously discussed. In depth 
examination made possible through interviews contributed significantly to the exploratory nature 
of this inquiry (Stebbens 2001). Codes were developed based upon theories addressed in 
Chapters 1 & 2, but these proved insufficient for a meaningful level of exploration.  
Emergent codes were also employed to facilitate a more comprehensive exploration of 
research questions (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). A qualitative approach made possible the 
methodological flexibility required to accommodate emergent coding. The necessity of emergent 
codes in the analysis of interview data also supported the need for a grounded theoretical 
approach consistent with qualitative methodology (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).  
Research Design 
The study involved in-depth interviews with current and/or past foundation professional 
staff, current and/or past foundation board members and foundation grantees. By interviewing 
foundation staff, board and grantee representatives, the data gathered could be triangulated. 
Triangulation was further supported by examining the data through multiple theories (Patton 
1999) and subsequent verification of findings with domain experts. Sixteen foundation board 
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members, 19 foundation staff and 16 grantees were interviewed. This resulted in 51 total 
interviews. Further, findings were reviewed with 6 domain experts. 
Interviews conducted resulted in data on 33 private foundations (e.g., located in 13 states) 
of which 30 were family, two were healthcare conversion foundations and one was started by the 
owner of a private company for company employee involvement. The mean assets of the 
foundations included in the study were $343.8 million (median of $57 million) with a range of 
$1 million to $5.99 billion. The following is more descriptive of the foundations (board members 
versus staff) and grantee organizations with which interviewees were associated.   
Foundation board members interviewed represented 15 private foundations with mean 
assets of $237.2 million. The range of assets of these foundations was $1.7 million to $2.3 
billion.  These foundations were located in seven states.  The average length of interview was 49 
minutes. 
Foundation staff members interviewed represented 22 private foundations with mean 
assets of $455 million. The range of assets of these foundations was $1.0 million to $5.99 billion.  
These foundations were located in 10 states.  The average length of interview was 54.8 minutes. 
Grantees interviewed represented 16 agencies with mean annual revenue of $4.22 
million. The range of annual revenue for these grantees was $400,000 to $13.9 million. These 
grantees were located in five states. The average length of interview was 43.8 minutes.  Of the 
grantees interviewed, 14 were paired with foundations included in this research. This led to 
important insights about shared perceptions of paired foundations and grantees, as well as 
perspectives unique to grantees. 
Interview questions were developed specifically for each group, but all interview guides 
(Appendices A, B and C) focused on the research questions identified in Chapter 1. The 
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interview format accommodated passive listening (Glaser 2002) to achieve deeper understanding 
regarding the subjects probed.  Interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded in developing 
responses to the research questions. The result was 499 pages of transcriptions, 181 pages coding 
and 153 pages of annotated notes. The responses were correlated between the three groups in an 
effort to differentiate perspectives between foundation board, foundation staff and grantees. With 
the exception of a few unique grantee perspectives (reported in Chapter 4), there was a 
remarkable level of consistency in comments across all three groups.   
While the interview format was guided by predetermined questions for each group, 
questions were intentionally limited in order to provide interviewees sufficient opportunity to 
add insight and context as they saw fit. The questions were intended to stimulate more than 
simple yes or no responses and were designed to stimulate a discussion of issues sufficient to 
achieve a deep level of understanding of both context and the perspectives of all participants 
(Glaser 2002). IRB approval was secured for this research on December 22, 2014.  
Data Analysis 
Creswell & Miller (2000) define validity in qualitative research by an accurate capturing 
of participant perspectives with credibility. They differentiate validity in qualitative study by 
involving participants in assessing accuracy of information gathered. The postpositivist approach 
employs distinct strategies for achieving validity.  
Such strategies included triangulation and an audit trail. Consistent with Patton (1999), 
triangulation was achieved by interviewing multiple groups and by examining the data from two 
existing theories (Moral Licensing and Resource Dependence) along with a grounded theoretical 
examination.  Also, the findings of the study were shared with six professionals with expertise in 
the domain of private philanthropy (representatives from four foundations and two grantees) as 
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peer-audits. These peer-audits resulted in confirmation of the findings reported in Chapter 4 and 
interpretations provided in Chapter 5. 
Validity in qualitative research was achieved in a fashion that is different from 
quantitative analysis (Creswell & Miller, 2000). Validity in qualitative research is related to how 
accurately insights gained from interviews actually represent the views of the subjects (Creswell 
& Miller 2000). This required a systematic process that captured “concepts, themes and 
dimensions” (Gioia, Corley, Hamilton, 2012 pg.22). Interviews were summarized for participants 
toward the end of interviews for the purpose of confirmation, disconfirmation and elaboration. 
The findings reported in Chapter 4 are the result of such confirmations.  
Validity was enhanced by recording and transcribing interviews. Then emerging thematic 
consistencies between transcripts were identified at multiple levels. Identifying common themes 
from the interviews provided insights from the perspectives of each of the three groups of 
participants. The data resulted in dynamic interrelations between responding groups (Gioia, 
Corley, Hamilton, 2012). 
Data was coded utilizing NVivo 10 software (Hilal & Alabri, 2013).  Initially, codes were 
developed to help guide analysis of the data provided by the interviews. Codes were then 
evaluated within the context of the data and their interrelationships.  Ultimately, a priori codes 
were reduced from 37 to 22. Additionally, 27 emergent codes were developed in support of 
emerging, grounded theory.  
Fifty-one interviews resulted in 499 pages of typed transcripts and approximately 153 
pages of annotated notes. Analysis involved coding of the data and cross checking of coding 
between transcripts and notes. Analysis of the data followed the four stages recommended by 
Bryman (2008), which are as follows: 
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Stage One: Careful, line-by-line review of each transcript using both pre-established and 
emerging codes. A priori codes were developed corresponding to the theoretical framework 
proposed in support of observations found in the literature. Emergent codes were developed in 
support of findings that instead seemed related to a more grounded theoretical context. As 
applicable, the transcripts were coded into either a priori or emergent codes. 
Stage Two: Transcripts were compared to detailed interview notes in order to identify 
emerging themes in the data. Of particular interest in this process was a comparison of data 
provided through foundation/grantee pairings. This process allowed for analysis of consistencies 
and potential inconsistencies, but also permitted further consolidation of codes and elimination 
of some that no longer seemed relevant based upon the data. 
Stage Three: Transcripts were loaded into NVivo 10 software for analysis. This resulted 
in 181 pages of detailed coding. This provided a rich data set for the purposes of this research, as 
well as a meaningful audit trail. 
Stage Four: Findings were utilized to systematically support emergent theoretical 
interpretation of the data. This was essential in developing grounded theory to interpret data, 
especially where findings were inconsistent with what had been discovered in the literature.    
 Coding summaries are provided in Appendices D, E, F, G, H and I.  
Purposive Sampling   
Purposive sampling was achieved through involvement of foundations and grantees from 
many different locations (e.g., foundations in 13 states, grantees in five states), diversity in size 
of participants (e.g., foundations in size from $1 million to $5.99 billion, grantees with annual 
revenues of $400,000 to $13.9 million) and significant differences in grant making interests. 
Taken together, the variation in participants provided richness in purposive sampling (Advice 
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2000). Participants were recruited through third parties including Philanthropy Southwest, the 
New Mexico Association of Grantmakers and Grantmakers for Education. Fifteen grantees were 
recruited with the assistance of foundation representatives who participated in interviews. One 
grantee participant volunteered through their involvement through a United Way affiliate.  
The opaque nature of private philanthropy has resulted in very little research in this field. 
By interviewing 16 foundation board members, 19 foundation staff members and 16 grantee 
representatives significant insights emerged to support interpretive research regarding private 
foundation practices related to opacity and whether opaqueness results in beneficial outcomes.  
In recruiting interview candidates, no single state or region was specifically targeted, but 
most interviewees were from the Southwest.  Participants were not solicited on the basis of 
demographics (e.g., organizational size, age, geographic region or area of focus), but information 
was gathered about each of their organizations. 
Trustworthiness 
 Trustworthiness is an essential consideration in designing a research project to assure that 
its findings are reliable and valid. According to Shenton (2004), this is a function of credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability. The following describes how each of these 
important elements of trustworthiness was achieved in this research:  
1. Credibility was enhanced by a thorough review of the literature, appropriate methods, 
domain-specific knowledge of the interviewer, accessing interviewee perspectives 
through third parties and triangulation of data from three distinct groups (Sinkovics & 
Alfoldi, 2012).  Interview questions were intentionally not overly confining, but were 
guided by factors thought to contribute to opaque philanthropy and corresponding 
expectations, based on a rigorous review of the literature. Interviewees were given 
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opportunities to add insights and context beyond the questions presented. The interviewer 
is sufficiently qualified (See Vita after appendices) with over 20 years of experience in 
managing private foundations, approximately eight years of experience in managing 
grantee organizations and having served on many nonprofit boards over the last three 
decades (Patton 1999). Further, peer audits were conducted with six domain experts. 
2. Transferability was supported by the number of interviews conducted (Shenton 2004). By 
interviewing 51 people, perspectives were gathered from variety of foundations and 
grantees, which is generally believed to be a meaningful sample of the field. 
3. Dependability was supported through consistency of questions, use of a single 
interviewer and overlapping populations (Shenton 2004). 
4. Confirmability was enhanced by triangulating the data between three sets of interviewee 
groups and examination of the data using multiple theories (Patton 1999), consistent 
methodology and with a good audit trail (Shenton 2004). Further, six domain experts 
independently confirmed the findings and interpretations of this research. The audit trail 
is comprised of interview recordings and transcripts, member checks through verbal 
summaries at the end of each interview and coding tables supporting the interpretive 
process. Conceptualizations followed patterns in the data (Glaser 2002). Member 
checking was accomplished by verbal summarization of key takeaways at the end of 
interviews for accuracy (Creswell & Miller, 2010). Participants were given the 
opportunity to confirm, disconfirm and further elaborate upon their comments. This 
enabled data to be verified with respect to both accuracy and context. 
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Summary 
Two existing theories (Moral Licensing and Resource Dependence) were used in 
developing research questions and a research design, based upon findings in the literature. 
Conceptualizing data is a form of theory (Glaser 2002). However, the proposed research design 
also left room for grounded theory to further understand contextual circumstances and possible 
benefits of opacity in private philanthropy. An emergent, grounded approach provided an 
opportunity to explore more comprehensively the research questions, especially where a priori 
theoretical frameworks proved insufficient (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). This proved necessary in 
explaining the findings of this research, especially as findings varied from what was found in the 
literature. 
This research explored the existence of opaque foundation practices, but also explored 
what appears to be insufficiently addressed in the foundation literature – identification of 
organizational/environmental factors that can lead to opacity. Further, consequences of opacity 
were explored as were strategies developed by foundations and grantees to overcome challenges 
related to opacity and a coexisting imbalance of power.  
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Chapter 4: Findings & Analysis 
Introduction 
 The private foundation literature implied that private philanthropy is significantly opaque 
(Fleishman 2007, Ostrander 2007) and ostensibly unaccountable (Sandy 2007) organizations 
who experience challenged relationships with grantees (Boldouc, Buchanan, Buteau, 2007, Tuan 
2004). The private foundation literature asserts that the state of opacity among private 
foundations is troublesome (Stone & Ostrower, 2007, Ostrander 2007, Hill & Jones, 1992) and 
that it exacerbates a coexistent power imbalance that naturally exists between foundations and 
grantees (Francisco & Shuii-Yan, 2007, Tuan 2004). Many researchers have called for greater 
transparency among private foundations (Fleishman 2007, Sandy 2007, Ostrander 2007) in an 
effort to ease concerns about opacity and, to a lesser extent, power imbalances. 
 The existence of both opaque foundation practices and an imbalance of power between 
foundations and grantees were clearly evident in the findings from this research. Unexpectedly, 
foundations and grantees, interviewed in this research, consistently reported a very different 
experience with respect to the effects of opacity and imbalanced power on their relationships. In 
fact, findings from this research indicate that these foundations were able to leverage their 
opaque status in beneficial ways and that foundations/grantees had successfully overcome 
challenges related to opacity and power imbalances.  
It appears from these findings that foundations adopted practices that created important 
benefits from the opaque circumstances in which they practice philanthropy and that foundations 
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and grantees have developed strategies to enhance their relationships and improve grant 
outcomes. Given the presence of these foundation strategies, grantees reported that effects of an 
imbalance of power between foundations and themselves seemed to become much less 
significant. These were very interesting and unexpected findings that offer important insights for 
policymakers and practitioners.  
 Based upon the existing private foundation literature, MLT and RDT were employed to 
help explain organizational/environmental influences on opaque foundation practices. The 
findings from this research found no significant evidence of moral licensing or entitlement-
related foundation motivation/conduct with respect to opacity. To the contrary, the data from this 
research resulted in a markedly different observation related to foundation motivation and 
conduct, at least for the foundations represented in this research.  
Specifically, foundations exhibited significant levels of vigilance with respect to (1) self-
imposed expectations regarding accountability, (2) the manner in which they engaged grantees as 
strategic partners and (3) efforts to enhance the effectiveness of their charitable activities for 
societal benefit. The foundation representatives interviewed appeared to experience considerable, 
internally-generated, accountability with high expectations for achieving meaningful grant 
outcomes. Grantees also observed a pattern of heightened focus by foundations in terms of 
achieving significant outcomes from their grants.  
MLT proved not to be a significant factor with respect to the foundations represented in 
this research. Instead of a presumption of entitlement, foundation representatives expressed 
significant fiduciary-orientation that seemed, at least in part, proportionate to the extent of 
prerogative/discretion enjoyed due to latitudes provided under law and/or power afforded by 
their resource-intense circumstance. This unexpected foundation motivation/conduct resulted in a 
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need for an emergent, grounded theoretical framework, especially given that these observations 
varied so significantly from the private foundation literature.  
On the other hand, influences of RDT in terms of asymmetrical distribution of power 
between foundations and grantees were universally reported by foundations and grantees. Yet, 
challenges related to imbalanced power reportedly dissipated as relationships between 
foundations and grantees became meaningful. This contextual finding also varied from the 
existing private foundation literature. Existing literature did not correlate the significance of 
foundation and grantee relationships to the effects of opacity or disparate power. The findings 
from this research support such a correlation, which can provide important insights to 
practitioners.  
The observation regarding such correlation suggested that RDT is useful in explaining 
certain foundation insider conduct. However, RDT does not contribute to understanding 
foundation insider behavior that contradicted expectations related to MLT. Consequently, RDT 
and emergent theory are needed to more comprehensively explain foundation insider motivation 
and behavior.   
This chapter is organized in several sections. First, findings are reported according the 
four research questions established in Chapter 1 (e.g., existence of opacity, organizational and/or 
environmental factors leading to opacity, negative and positive consequences of opacity and 
foundation/grantee strategies for overcoming challenges related to opacity and imbalanced 
power). Second, an emergent theory is provided in an effort to explain unexpected findings 
regarding foundation behavior. Third, observations are reported based upon foundation/grantee 
pairings. Lastly, grantee-specific concerns regarding foundations are summarized.    
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Existence of Opacity in Private Philanthropy 
Confirmation of opacity in private philanthropy was, at least in part, supported by several 
findings from this research. Such findings included foundation ability to control external access, 
to resist unwanted external influence and sustain insider control. Further, an absence of external 
accountability, unimpeded discretion with respect to grant decision making and perceived 
freedom to take risks without fear of consequences was evident. All of these observations 
support the ability of private foundations to exercise and preserve opaque practices that insulate 
them from influences from outside their organizational bounds.  
Findings supporting the existence of opacity in private philanthropy were consistent with 
what would be expected with organizations that are largely insular, not dependent upon resources 
from external entities and who experience an absence of external constituents to which they are 
accountable. While evidence supported the existence of opacity in private philanthropy, an 
unexpected finding was that foundations appear to use some features of opacity in strategic ways 
to enhance their efficiency and effectiveness. Evidence did support the existence of some 
negative consequences related to opacity in private philanthropy, but observations regarding 
intentional use of opaque practices by private foundations to enhance efficiency and 
effectiveness were unexpected, because the literature did not suggest that opacity could be used 
for such practical purposes.  
 The following five sections describe how private foundations utilize their state of opacity 
to control access by outsiders, resist unwanted external influences, maintain insider control, 
avoid external accountability and exercise freedom to take risks without sensitivity to, or fear of, 
consequences from outside constituents. 
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1. Ability to Control Access: Foundations have exercised considerable ability to control 
external access. To some extent, controlling outside access may be necessary to avoid 
becoming overwhelmed by grantee inquiries and applications. Some foundations have 
intentionally pursued a low public profile by not having websites and/or making grants 
anonymously to avoid unwanted attention. Opacity was intentionally used by some 
foundations to prevent unwanted inquiries. Foundations reported that such practices were 
used to become increasingly more focused in their grant programs and less reactive to 
uninteresting grant requests. 
“The foundation was moving away from doing as much reactive granting. They 
were just being flooded with proposals and really wanted to go deeper in some 
areas.”  FB-221 
 
“We don't have a website. Most of our grants we requested that [grantees] not 
announce our name.” FS-101   
 
“We don’t have an annual report or our own website…we just trust that all of this 
[foundation information] is out there on GuideStar and, you know, we’re really 
careful about our tax returns making sure it is accurate…there is no other means 
that I’m pushing data out there to the public.” FS-106 
 
Some foundations have become increasingly proactive in pursuing grant programs 
in which they have high levels of interest. This has been achieved by actively seeking out 
of grantees with similar interests to develop specific programs, adopting invitation-only 
grant application processes and/or by discouraging applicants by deferring grant 
consideration until after a time-intensive, lengthy relationship development process. 
 
“I would probably put it [private foundation access] in a category that it’s 
probably a little more difficult to access”. G-101 
 
 “Grant applications are increasingly by invitation only.” FS-102 
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While foundations appear to employ opaque practices that successfully limit 
access by outsiders, grantees report that once relationships deepen with foundations, 
access becomes much less limited and that they are subsequently treated more like valued 
partners. This dynamic is addressed in greater depth later.  
 
“Foundations you know, the deep meaningful relationships that we have with 
those private foundations are not providing us with any obstacles or hurdles.” G-
101 
 
“I think [a private foundation] is more difficult to get to know, but once you can 
build a track record and a relationship. So maybe getting in the door is harder, 
but once the door is opened it’s a lot easier.” G-102 
 
The findings from this research clearly demonstrated that opacity is intentionally 
utilized by private foundations expressly for the purpose of controlling/limiting access by 
outsiders to avoid potential for being flooded with unwanted requests and to better 
manage interactions with more interesting grantees and projects. However, grantees that 
do not have prior relationships with foundations can be confused and frustrated about 
inaccessibility-related concerns. 
2. Ability to Resist External Influence: Another example of the opaque circumstances in 
which private philanthropy is practiced is evidenced by foundation ability to resist 
unwanted external influence. Private foundations practice what is referred to 
“philanthropic freedom” – the ability to practice untethered philanthropy by pursuing 
internal interests and resisting outside efforts to exercise influence (Hudson Institute, 
2015).  
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Consistent with tenants of RDT, foundations, as resource-intense and independent 
entities, can maintain remarkable levels of autonomy (Bryant & Davis, 2012). Private 
foundations do not engage in fundraising, because they are endowed organizations that 
provide their own resources to support both operating expenses and grant activity. 
 
”We don’t raise money...foundation’s don’t feel like they’re being threatened.” 
FS-351   
 
Foundations and grantees reported that efforts by outsiders to exercise influence 
are largely unsuccessful with private foundations. Private foundations are free to chart 
their own courses, subject only to limited legal regulation. Private foundations enjoy a 
uniquely high level of autonomy and independence (Fleishman 2007, Ostrander 2007, 
Sandy 2007). 
 
“I’ve not faced any political pressure from anybody…We haven’t succumbed to 
any of the pressure.” FB-201 
 
“So, if somebody calls on your behalf, if the mayor calls on your behalf, you 
might have a better chance at the community foundation than if the mayor calls a 
private foundation.” G-122 
  
Ability to resist external pressure, allows foundations to sharply focus on work 
they consider appropriate. This includes the ability to elect whether or not to provide 
grant support for what may be perceived as important projects, but that may be politically 
controversial. Examples shared in interviews included controversies surrounding 
abortion-related concerns with Planned Parenthood and sexual preference-related issues 
that have been associated with the Boys Scouts of America.  
The Opacity of Private Philanthropy 
 
 
51 
 
Wherever individual foundations may stand regarding the merits of, and/or 
controversies related to, specific grantees, they appear to enjoy philanthropic freedom as 
they internally decide grant elections without imposition of concerns related externalities 
of political influence. Thus, foundations feel free to decide grants upon their own sense of 
merit – supporting what they consider to be important work, independent of 
considerations related to public opinion at a given time.  
Another measure of autonomy, or opacity, in private philanthropy is the freedom 
foundations experience to internally determine their own interests and independently 
chart a course for grant making. Foundation representatives did not report perceived 
limitations of consequence with respect to their grant making discretion. To the contrary, 
they consistently reported great latitude with respect to the philanthropic freedom they 
experienced. 
“There’s certain restrictions like a private foundation can’t lobby itself versus a 
public foundation can do some lobbying…I think that’s the biggest restriction.” 
FS-351   
 
 Foundations reported that they felt unimpeded with respect to the internal 
elections they make with respect to areas of charitable giving and/or specific grant 
awards. Other than self-imposed commitments to honor donor intent, foundations 
practice great autonomy with respect to their grant decisions. 
 
“As a private foundation, you have so much leeway in making your own 
decisions. And I think that the community foundations are certainly kind of 
impeded by a bureaucratic demand or procedural demand.” FB-220 
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3. Insider Control: Consistent with findings in the private foundation literature, foundations 
represented in this research were significantly insider-controlled (Bolton & Mehran, 
2006). Nearly two-thirds of the board members for the foundations represented were 
classified as insiders (e.g., donors, donor families, family friends, business associates). 
Initial board members were typically appointed by donors and subsequently 
appointed/reappointed by their own boards. The ability to perpetuate insider control is 
clearly a practice related to prerogatives afforded by opacity.  
 
“[the founder] had to make a decision as how many he wanted on the board and 
that type of thing, and he chose me [his accountant] and [another business 
associate]…he knew him well. [The donor] decided that [his son] would not be 
appropriate to be on the board.” FB-211 
 
 Another interesting finding in this research was that foundation staff, typically at 
the level of the chief executive officer (and occasionally other senior level positions), too 
were often insiders, using the same definition previously applied to board members. A 
significant practice of appointing insider staff was evident in the interviews. 
 
“Because we are a private family foundation, the board members are appointed 
by the…the donors.”…”I was the coach of our president. I was the coach of his 
daughter during her years on an elementary school soccer team. He realized my 
interest in slicing and dicing data, he recruited get me to come to the foundation.” 
FS-112  
 
“We are a family foundation, so the board members, it's self-perpetuating the, we 
elect the board members every spring, but, for 22 years it's been family.” FS-101 
 
“I advised some of the family members…and then so I got invited on as the first 
non-family, grant making committee member, and then actually became the first 
non-family board of trustee member. I had the opportunity and honor to work 
with both the patriarch and matriarch of the family…So, I got to work for 
them…having served as board member as well as being staff.” FS-351   
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Perpetuating insider control at the board and management levels is a clear 
opacity-related practice resulting in organizational insularity (Ostrander 2007), but 
foundations reported that such decisions were significantly influenced by a desire to 
achieve/maintain effective governance and management chemistry for the benefit of 
efficient, coherent organization and functioning. This contrasted with findings in the 
private foundation literature that implied motivation was to sustain insider control 
(Bolton & Mehran, 2006). Foundations emphasized benefits from careful selection of 
people serving in board and/or managerial roles with the objective of working effectively 
with one another, which can result in more efficient organizational and programming 
dynamics. 
While the majority of boards for the foundations in this research were consistently 
comprised primarily of insiders, families were conscious of, and sensitive, to the fact that 
not all insiders can work together effectively. When families experienced internal 
conflict, they reportedly sought to insulate their foundations from counterproductive 
effects of such dynamics. 
“My sister and I don't always play well in the sandbox together, so they have 
people to balance that out. We have attorneys that help us with that kind of stuff, 
and help us with the family.” FB-204 
 
Interviews with foundation representatives suggested that private foundation 
insiders employed highly pragmatic approaches in selecting board and management 
candidates that emphasized a sense of priority with respect to efficient management of 
private foundations over the interests of perpetuating insider control. 
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4. Lack of External Accountability: The literature suggested that private foundations are 
among the least accountable social institutions in the U.S. (Sandy 2007). Foundations 
reported that they did not feel externally accountable, evidenced by an apparent absence 
of need to report their achievements and discoveries at a public level. While willing to 
engage in conversations with other foundations about grant experiences, there was little 
evidence of systematic effort to externally share grant outcomes, innovations and/or 
important lessons learned from grant making activities. While this fact was often credited 
with the fact that foundations are typically understaffed for the purposes external 
reporting, it didn’t seem an important priority – evidence of an election relative to a 
presumed level of prerogative. 
“I’m willing to have conversations with anybody about these things, but I really 
don’t have some sort of systematic way of conveying these lessons learned to the 
broader philanthropic community.” “If this had been my personal money, I 
probably wouldn’t have made this grant…but this is a partnership and these 
individuals were really passionate about what this organization was doing and 
they really thought they could help them. And so we need to see this through 
regardless of how it turns out.” FS-106 
 
An observed absence of perceived need to account externally for the management 
of tax-advantaged funds also seems compelling evidence of the existence of opacity in 
private philanthropy. 
5. Freedom to Take Risks: The final measure of opacity expressed in the data from 
interviews was a perceived capacity to assume significant levels of risk in grant decisions 
without fear of publicly-imposed repercussions related to potential project failures. In 
fact, foundations seemed to embrace an ethos in favor of taking risks in the grant projects 
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they fund with the express goal of supporting innovative efforts not thought possible 
through more public funders.   
“Well, I believe [private] philanthropy can do things that the public sector cannot. 
I believe we can take risks and try new things to see if they do work. That then 
allows for new systems to emerge that can be utilized by the-by the public sector. 
So, I just think there's a level of innovation that we can take on.” FS-122 
 
The fact that foundations feel a level of immunity from public scrutiny with 
respect to risky grants also provides evidence of the existence of opacity in private 
philanthropy. 
“You can take a lot more risk. You can be a lot more independent in your 
thinking. There's nobody [who] can threaten you.” FS-103 
 
 Not all grant-related risks are necessarily for the express purpose of achieving 
innovation. There are times when foundations can help attract attention to, and build 
momentum for, important projects by providing grants in the early stages of a fundraising 
campaign. Foundation financial support can lend credibility for new projects, as well as 
new ideas. Early foundation grants can help attract other supporters, because expressions 
of foundation support can encourage credibility for proposed projects. 
“So, in terms of risk taking, our foundation says…we trial things. That’s part of 
what we do. We have the ability to try things and so we do. And so, we just had an 
example where we were the first money in and I would say that has an element of 
risk.” FB-212 
  
Figure 3 illustrates the evidence from the data in this research supporting the existence of opacity 
in private philanthropy. 
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 Figure 3 
 
Organizational/Environmental Factors Contributing to Opacity 
Based upon observations in the private foundation literature, five organizational and/or 
environmental factors were thought to lead to or support the existence of opacity in private 
philanthropy. Figure 2 in Chapter 2 provided a force-field analysis showing how certain internal 
and external influences may support these five factors, which are believed to encourage opacity 
in private philanthropy. The factors included competing motives for creating foundations, self-
appointed/self-sustained boards, disparate power between foundations and grantees, effects of 
limited regulation and confusion regarding ownership of foundation assets. Based upon 
perspectives gathered from interviews, the following are findings from this research that 
correspond to the specific to these five factors described in Chapter 2: 
1. Competing Motives for Creating Foundations: The interviews provided no clear evidence 
that foundation behavior resulted from motives related to creating private foundations. 
While this may be a factor in a theoretical context for some foundations, the foundation 
representatives interviewed seemed more consistently motivated by the charitable 
objectives of their organizations. Deference to donor intent, with respect to charitable 
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interests, was evident in interviews, but no evidence surfaced in support of the existence 
of motivational instrumentality (Anheier and Leat, 2012, Ellwanger & Gassman 2010, 
Schnall, 2008), as described in Chapter 2. Motivations for creating foundations did not 
seem to contribute to foundation behavior and/or existence of opacity. Instead, there was 
a consistent and dominant focus on achieving significant outcomes from grants for the 
benefit of society. 
 
“Internally, we can have some real clear conversations and focus on what really 
matters.” FB-201 
 
2. Self-Appointed/Self-Sustained Boards: The overwhelming majority (nearly two-thirds) of 
boards of the foundations represented in this research were comprised of insiders (e.g., 
founders, founder families, friends, business colleagues). This was consistent with the 
private foundation literature (Bolton & Mehran, 2006) and seems to correlate with other 
insular dynamics (Fleishman 2007, Ostrander 2007). This said, the reported motivation 
for heavy use of insiders seemed more related to a desire for good chemistry in support of 
organizational coherence and efficiency than an effort to assert insider control. There was 
evidence that foundations may also consider needed skills and connections, as well as 
chemistry when appointing board members. 
 
“They sought me out because they needed more financial expertise on the board, 
they knew I was retiring from the board of regents and [my background] as well. 
So, I was approached to help, because of my financial background. Most board 
members are rather high profile in the community, but some board members had 
contact with [the donors]…their attorney for example…So, it is not uncommon to 
look for board members that people already have pre-existing relationships…to 
assure that what they have at the end of the day is a board that can work very 
effectively together.” FB-207   
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3. Disparate Power: Consistent with tenants of RDT, both foundation and grantee 
representatives acknowledged that private foundations enjoy much more power than 
grantees (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This was evident with respect to the level of 
discretion enjoyed by foundations in making grant decisions and the ability to impose 
accountability onto grantees. However, the effects of disparate power seem to dissipate as 
foundation-grantee relationships become more meaningful. Foundations appeared to 
make intentional elections about when to use their disparate power. There was clear use 
of power in protecting against unwanted access and potential external interference. 
 
“Because there’s no question that imbalance of power exists, and it’s also 
perceived in areas when it’s not acted on - that imbalance of power is 
there.”…”It’s the foundation’s choice whether or not to act on that, whether or 
not to tie a lot of strings to our giving.” FS-112 
 
Foundations also appear willing to relax their disparate power when interacting with 
strategic grantees. Grantees who enjoy strategic status in the perspectives of private 
foundations report that an imbalance of power doesn’t affect the quality, or enjoyment, of 
their relationships with foundations. Foundations reported that they viewed strategic 
grantees as valued partners, not as subordinate entities. 
 
“I find the family foundations - private foundations - that we deal with to be 
really treating us like equal partners. I mean I feel like they are open to learning 
from us. They acknowledge that we're sort of experts in the thing that we do every 
day that they're curious and open to us shaping the, the grant project, so to speak, 
more so than their-- they make very few demands.” G-204a 
 
“So it requires, you know, a lot of trust building in order to overcome that [power 
imbalance]. I think it's that power dynamic at play. How do we really get down to 
that so that our grant making is [influenced by] how we talk about that [power] 
around the people? How do we overcome that so that our greatest asset, which is 
our resources, whether it's human or financial, can actually play a functional role 
in the bigger picture of things and not be part of the problem? I think about it all 
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the time, while at the same time leading, right, so I wonder how we incentivize 
collaboration without it having the negative effects of that [power] dynamic. 
Because ultimately, you know, you can see what's needed.” FS-122 
 
“One of the first things I did as a program officer is change the narrative. We no 
longer refer to anyone as grantees, we refer to them as grant partners. We cannot 
succeed in our mission of creating a better community without partners. So, those 
who are receiving grants from us are considered partners. It doesn't necessarily 
solve the-the power imbalance, but it sure helps.” FS-123 
  
4. Limited Regulation: Data from interviews substantiated that private foundations do not 
perceive themselves as significantly constrained by regulations. To the contrary, private 
foundations reported that they enjoy significant discretion in their ability to appoint board 
members and staff, make grants and ignore public sentiment with respect to grant projects 
internally viewed as important. 
5. Confused Ownership: Foundation board and staff members were highly deferential to 
founders. When founders were active on the boards of their foundations, foundation 
representatives observed that such boards almost always supported founder wishes and 
preferences. In this circumstance, founders were treated by other insiders as if foundation 
assets were the personal property of founders.  
 
“As the patriarch of the family [and founder], people look to [my dad] as the 
principle. In some regards we're just trying to be good stewards and hold true to 
[his preferences]. He's still alive so it's very easy to see [his] intentions. And it 
would be really unlikely that the board would vote for something that my dad was 
opposed to.” FB-204 
 
Given that foundation assets were the result of generous founder gifts and 
privileges provided to foundation insiders under U.S. Tax Law; insider deference to 
donor preference/intent was easily understood. Otherwise, there was no real evidence of 
confusion regarding ownership of foundation assets during interviews. Foundation 
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insiders seemed aware of the privileges associated with their fiduciary roles, but this 
seemed to give rise to vigilant behavior rather than entitlement.  
 
“I generally think that [foundation] role is a big one and I guess it’s both a 
privilege and an obligation – you know, responsibility and an obligation. And that 
you are still representing these stewards of funds on behalf of a community or a 
grantee pool of people. I think they’re the biggest stakeholders.” FB-220  
 
“Ultimately, you're wanting to better, create more impact and have effective 
communities and healthier communities. It has something to do with coordinated 
efforts. I don't want to call it collective impact, but ultimately creating alliances is 
harder to do within the non-profit sector than it is within the business 
community.” FS-122 
 
Negative Consequences of Opacity: 
 In addition to calls for greater public awareness of how tax-advantaged funds are utilized 
(Fleishman 2007, Ostrander 2007, Sandy 2007), several findings related to opacity in private 
philanthropy were characterized as problematic. The findings from this research supported the 
existence three specific negative consequences from opaque foundation practices. 
1. Inaccessibility: While some foundations may have strategies to reduce random access to a 
manageable level, grantees can find opaque foundation practices confusing. Such 
practices can include assuming a low profile (e.g., anonymous grant making), not having 
websites, an absence of explicit grant criteria, lack of clear application procedures and/or 
a grant application process that is limited to invited grantees only. Grantees that are 
inexperienced, or have yet to develop meaningful relationships, with private foundations 
may be confused and frustrated by accessibility-related issues. By contrast to more public 
funders, grantees thought that private foundations were considerably less transparent. 
 
“Grant applications are now [increasingly more] by invitation only.” FS-102 
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“Foundations are not as transparent as other funders” G-301 
 
“Private foundations are more difficult than other funders to understand” G-101 
 
2. Rapidity of Changes in Grant Strategy: Given their opaque character, foundations enjoy 
the prerogative of evolving their interests and/or strategies without providing advance 
knowledge to interested outsiders. Grantees expressed concern that foundations can 
change funding interests and/or strategies too quickly. Such rapid changes are 
experienced as disruptive to grantees. 
 
“It's harder-- it's harder with [private foundations], because they tend to change 
more. You have to kind of keep on top of having that conversation with them. I 
feel like we have to drive the relationship in some ways so that they haven't 
changed a direction and we have no idea about it. I feel like as long as we're 
being proactive with maintaining good communication with them that we can kind 
of keep up. But it's not as easy and too often I see their areas of focus 
changed…One good example would be the [blank] Foundation.  So, we've loved 
working with them, but just a couple of years ago, they changed their areas of 
focus to where social service is still kind of on the agenda, but at the bottom of the 
agenda. And, I think, you know, they still think very highly of us, but I didn't learn 
till he came on a site visit here that kind that that change of priority has 
happened...That would have been really helpful to know.” G-107 
 
“Foundations can move/change too quickly” G-301 
“I guess, if you look at the only downside, it's, you're working with living donors, 
and they can change their mind, and they do change their mind. And so, one 
minute they really support something, and the next minute they don't when it 
[angers] them and they're done with that topic. That can be a little bit more 
challenging for us, um, but, you know, in the relative sense” FB-221 
  
3. Poor External Communication: Grantees reported that they believed foundations expect 
timely and substantive communication from them, but that foundations are not good 
communicators themselves. Grantees expressed concern about significant changes, 
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implemented without advance notice by foundations that impacted grantees. The insular 
nature of private foundations may cause foundation insiders to under estimate the 
importance of their efforts to communicate with interested outsiders. 
 
“And here's an example of a sort of arbitrary change. The foundation had been 
giving us $50,000 a year, and without any advance warning or explanation just 
said, you can request $30,000." G-220 
 
“I would say, you know, their board of directors really wants to move in a 
different direction or they’re going to conferences and they’re learning about, you 
know, there’s a certain trend that they’re wanting to fund more or impact funding. 
There’s a different kind of approach. A lot of that’s really hard to get assessed of 
unless I’m calling and asking what’s new with the foundation? They may not 
know, say the same, or say we’re also gonna start shifting our funding to more 
impact funding or collaborative funding, you know, that kind of thing.” G-107 
 
Positive Consequences of Opacity:  
While examples of negative consequences related to opacity emerged from interviews, positive 
outcomes of opaque foundation practices were also observed in the data from interviews. Some 
of the positive outcomes observed were thought to contribute significant value to important 
aspects of private foundation work. The following is a list of positive consequences thought 
related to the opaque circumstances in which private foundations exist. 
1. Ability to Make Important, But Controversial Grants: Making grants outside the watchful 
eye of the public can allow private foundations the convenience of considering 
controversial, but important grants – an option that might not be possible for more public 
funders. As previously noted, some grantees may, from time to time, suffer from public 
controversies that can severely limit their ability to access critically needed funding. 
Private foundations seem to have the philanthropic freedom to consider such needs on the 
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basis of project merit rather than public or political popularity. This can contribute to a 
more objective basis for making grants. More transparent circumstances might impede 
the ability to decide upon grants merely on the basis of the merits and need related to a 
proposed intervention. 
 
“I think the word private still has merit and it is not to be construed as 
conspiratorial or dark in the corners. I think the word transparency is greatly 
overused and overstated. In fact, in the inhibiting, I think the power of private 
philanthropy can move quickly, take risks, fund controversial things that public 
entities cannot, search and demonstrate the basic light of, um, and a basic article 
of faith that one can bear witness to their beliefs through their giving and you 
don’t have the abrogation if the project fails…We don’t want to be so tight with 
guidelines that we forget to take risks.” FB-218 
 
“With regard to advantages, I would certainly think that certain of the public-type 
entities are more restricted in the way they can give.” FB-211 
 
“I think with most of our private funders that they care about what we're doing. 
They care about - at the end of the day - the lives that have been impacted in our 
community, the people who've walked through our doors and, that's expressed I 
think quite a bit more than it is in the public setting. A lot of times the public 
[funders] just feels like we've got this pot of money, we have to put it out there for 
bid or open it up or whatever-- you know. And it's more of a job rather than 
caring about the person that's at the end of those dollars that's being impacted. 
So, I think that-that care and concern for the people we're serving in the 
community's expressed much differently in the relationships I have with 
private foundations. It's not usually expressed in those words or terms with the 
public funder. Though, it communicates to me as the executive director that they 
care, it's not just a job.” G-204b 
 
2. Tolerance for Failure: Grantees reported that private foundations are unafraid of potential 
for grant projects that can fail to achieve desired results. Foundations do not account to 
external parties for failed projects, and therefore, can create space for grantees to learn 
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without adverse consequences related to failure. Grantees reported that foundations are 
willing to learn with them. 
 
“They’re willing to learn with us” G-107 
 
“Sometimes [grants are] not going to work out for reasons that are outside of your 
control, but had it worked out it would have been a big pay-off and worth the 
[money] you put into it.” FS-105 
 
 
3. Risk Tolerance/Innovation: Foundations appear to possess a significant desire to enhance 
outcomes from their grants. In this regard, foundations and grantees agreed that private 
foundations have a much greater willingness to embrace risk in their grant making for the 
purposes of seeking innovation and to expand their impact. Foundations work in an 
environment in which it is easier to take risks, because they don’t account to external 
constituents. Several foundations said that they made grants with significant risk in an 
effort to achieve especially significant outcomes.  
Risky grants were clearly viewed by those foundations as grants that constituted 
big bets. This represented the sort of entrepreneurialism in grant making that Dowie 
(2001) suggested might exist. This research resulted in considerable evidence that many 
private foundations actively engage in risky grant making with the hope of achieving 
very positive results.  
The opaque circumstances in which foundations exist create a relatively 
consequence-free scenario for embracing risk. This, combined with a desire to expand 
impact and tolerance for failure, contributes to a unique capacity for private foundations 
to experiment and innovate. Absent the conditions of opacity, private foundations might 
become increasingly risk-averse. 
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“We don’t have sort of a calculated risk scenario, I think [the donor] would love 
to have seen us get more to that [embrace risk] role…for us it’s, what can we 
learn?”…This is a risky grant, but we know we’ll learn something from that.”… 
“[The donor] says, I’m not afraid to drill dry holes – that’s where the money came 
from.” FS-112 
   
4. Flexibility: Grantees reported that foundations are highly nimble, flexible organizations. 
Foundations are highly adaptive – able to change with evolving circumstances. As 
informal/ad hoc entities, foundations generally avoid bureaucracy in favor of adaptability 
with regard to desired outcomes and meaningful grantee relations. Foundations are 
generally able to respond to opportunities as they emerge and as they change. Grantees 
who enjoy deep, meaningful relationships with private foundations indicate they prefer 
working with private foundations over other categories of grant making organizations. 
 
“I think our ability to respond quickly. And I acknowledge that a United Way can 
make a very quick grant, [and] the Red Cross in a situation of crisis, but we can 
act even more quickly.”…”and I would think any private philanthropy has that 
discretionary opportunity to say there’s something happening and we need to 
respond.”…”That’s the ability to be nimble is probably unique to private 
philanthropy.” FS-112  
 
“Well, I was in the state legislature, and you know, tried to get funding for certain 
programs. And I had to get 18 senators and 51 house members to agree with me 
to get funding. And, you know, one, you can do it, but real innovative programs, 
you know, to try to set a new standard of quality or something in the public 
schools to show the impact of the arts or something. And there's just so, there's so 
much flexibility, I guess. But a freedom, I feel if we can work with an individual, 
someone who's passionate about their program, is trying to improve early 
childhood education or the arts in the schools get a lot of those proposals. Most of 
our museum grants are in the area of education. I mean, we have not only 
freedom, but it just feels like we have impact. I can do $100,000 into a program 
that I probably never could have gotten as a state legislator…and a lot of similar 
issues that we see and deal with.” FS-101 
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“All I can really think of is benefits, because I do feel I can see that it’s the 
flexibility when you’re applying as far as timeframes…and criteria.” G-105b 
 
“With a lot of those other funders, sometimes there’s just a lot – the proposals 
tend to be technical, the reporting sometimes we have to do backflips with our 
database to, you know, work in additional reporting requirements.” G-107 
 
“You know, in the relative sense, we have so much more, uh, flexibility than 
corporate or community. A great, great advantage.” G-221 
 
 These positive consequences of opaque foundation practices are not trivial. To the 
contrary, they enable private foundations to make very significant contributions to the public 
good. Absent opportunities inherent in opacity, private foundations might conduct their affairs 
more consistent with other categories of grant making entities and become less able to make 
special contributions within the unique footprint of private philanthropy. 
Foundation/Grantee Strategies 
 While there are several important positive outcomes from opaque foundation practices, 
negative consequences were also observed in the interviews. However, it became apparent that 
foundations and grantees have developed a variety of strategies they voluntarily implement to 
help reduce and manage negative consequences related to opacity. While seeking to manage such 
negative consequences, strategies adopted by foundations and grantees also seemed to reduce the 
effects of disparate power between them.  
Grantee Strategies: 
 Grantees reported they have been successful in overcoming challenges to their relations 
with foundations related to opacity. This reportedly resulted from several strategies that seem to 
follow a sequence of steps to improve access, achieve mission alignment with foundations and 
build trust. It was clear that these grantees enjoyed good relationships with partnering 
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foundations in which they did not experience untoward effects of opaque foundation practices or 
imbalanced power. Eliminating or reducing barriers to access to, and relationship development 
with, foundations proved important to grantees.  
 
“I think, you know, as you work with foundations you may see that they had 
multiple, you know, philanthropic interests. You know, what are they giving to? 
What are their core areas of giving? How that continues to evolve and change 
and then [consider] what's happening at the university that we feel like we can, we 
can match up… But, if we think we've got something to work on, we feel like we've 
got a good match, then we'll certainly go after that.” G101  
 
Given the power difference that exists between foundations and grantees, grantees are 
often deferential to foundations in assuring that their projects are positioned to more clearly align 
with foundation interests and values.  
 
“We found that foundations are pretty specific about their giving priorities. So, 
we do the benefit of having a very good office of development here on campus and 
they do very proactive work in that regard looking for these areas or looking for 
where they see a tie that we ought to investigate.” G-101 
 
“You know, they-- people want to be the smartest people in the room, and they 
want to have an algorithm that is you know, so um, now again carefully created, I 
mean that's my prejudice. But, that's kind of the way I think about it…I think that 
while they come forward with the idea that they want to support.”  G-122 
 
Through this research, both foundations and grantees observed that two conditions 
needed to exist in overcoming access and relationship development concerns. These included 
development of shared perceptions of aligned mission/purpose and establishment of mutual trust. 
When both conditions existed, grantees became strategic in the view of the foundations that then 
began to treat such grantees as valued partners. Grantee strategies tended to focus on enhancing 
access and developing meaningful relationships with foundations. 
The Opacity of Private Philanthropy 
 
 
68 
 
A three step process emerged in the interviews for achieving the aforementioned 
objectives, which resulted in grantees becoming strategic from the view of private foundations. 
They involved effective prospecting, achieving mutually perceived alignment of missions with 
such foundations and realizing effective inter-organizational engagement. The following 
summarizes reported objectives and corresponding strategies intended to build sequentially upon 
each other in a layered fashion. 
1. Improving Access: This involved effective prospecting strategies – requiring the 
development of a deep understanding of foundation interests and values, as well as 
investing significant time in getting to know foundation insiders well ahead of making a 
grant request. This is a “foundation-centered” approach in which grantees, through 
reviewing multiple reference materials/resources (e.g., websites, foundation directories, 
online databases such as GuideStar and the Foundation Center) and instigating direct 
interactions with foundation insiders, gathered as much information as possible about 
foundations.  
Grantees carefully studied foundation mission statements, grant histories and other 
available information. They then spent as much time as possible talking with foundation 
insiders to develop deep insights about foundation interests and values. During this 
process, grantees sought to develop collegial and informed relationships with foundation 
representatives. 
 
“I would say that one of the biggest things is our ability to develop relationships, 
more of the personal relationships with the private foundations.” G-402  
 
“There's some sort of…barrier [no foundation website] there, and maybe that's 
for screening out things they don't want to do or fund - we weren't successful in 
building a relationship with them and ultimately getting any support. You know, 
so there's no one locally that I could pick up the phone and say, "Hey do you 
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know one of these trustees," and, "Would you go with me to visit with them?" G-
204b 
 
“I think it certainly is more difficult [than with public funders], you know, to get 
in, basically get in the door when you haven't had something [a relationship], 
established. I think one thing in development we know that those that have given 
to your institution or are passionate about your institution continue to give.” G-
101  
 
“So you have to look at their area of expertise and then you have to be very 
careful about their geographic area. And then you have to look at who at their 
organizations that they funded, just trying to see where they go and see where 
they -  first of all to see the size of the grants that they give, but also, you know, 
what are they looking for. You have to know your foundations.” G-103b 
 
2. Achieving Mission Alignment: Once access has been improved and good insights exist 
regarding foundation interests and values, grantees carefully reviewed their projects 
through the lens of such interests and values. Then grantees sought to make appropriate 
changes to their projects and enhanced the descriptions of their programs such that they 
more clearly aligned with foundation interests and values. 
 
“There are a couple [grants] that stand out that we've recently received. I would 
say from where I sit and the fundraising model that we use it's very relationship-
driven focusing on sustainability. It was really developed to focus on working 
with individuals and securing pledges from them through just engaging them in a 
relationship with our mission. And, so we use certain aspects of that with the 
foundations that we work with. And, one of the local foundations that has been 
really I just feel like they're more of a partner…And, the relationship with this 
foundation, it's just then much more of a conversation.”  G-107 
 
3. Building Trust: Grantees built upon their improved foundation access and perceived 
alignment of missions with engagement-related strategies. This involved actively seeking 
foundation input and guidance during project development/assessment, seeking to 
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improve impact, evidencing a commitment to becoming increasingly innovative and 
effective, demonstrating willingness to be accountable and adopting a practice of candor 
and regular communication with foundations. 
 
“I think it does because we do find ourselves making sure we keep in, I think, 
closer contact with some of the private foundations of keeping them up to date on 
what's going on.” G-402 
 
  As part of the trust-building process, grantees reported that they embraced 
foundation expectations regarding accountability. They acknowledged the importance of 
accountability within the context of foundation interest in achieving impact. 
 
“You know, we have some due diligence with that foundation, and we want to 
steward it [the grant] well. We want the impact of their gift to be understood and, 
and that they can see that what we said we were going to do, we've done. So, you 
know, timely reporting and all those things are, are very important.” G-101  
 
“A lot of a-accounting. You know what I mean? And you have to send the receipts 
for everything and if you have a draw. There's a level of accountability and 
transparency that, as a nonprofit you have to maintain, but especially when you're 
dealing with a private foundation.” G-103b 
Figure 4 
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In seeking foundation input, grantees noted that foundations seemed to possess valuable 
insights into the communities they serve. 
 
“What I see is a lot of our private foundations are gaining an understanding of 
the community and what the community needs are, and so they're working in 
partnership that way with the community as well.” G-402 
 
“I think once we get a grant, I always assume there's an expectation that they are 
going to want to hear from us about how the dollars they've invested with us and 
what the impact has been. So, I mean, the relationship doesn't stop and start back 
up when it's time to reapply again, there's information sharing and sharing of 
successes and even setbacks with those foundations. In my experience, doing that 
has been very good, some foundations want more feedback than others. That's 
part of figuring out the relationship with the different private foundations and 
what their expectations are in terms of even recognition. Like I said, knowing how 
their dollars are impacting the community.” G-204b 
 
To the extent grantees were able to execute on the aforementioned strategies, they 
reported that the foundations embraced and treated them as valued partners and that challenges 
related to both opacity and imbalanced power seemed to dissipate. 
 
“I find the family foundations - private foundations - that we deal with to be 
really treating us like equal partners. I mean I feel like they are open to learning 
from us. They acknowledge that we're sort of experts in the thing that we do every 
day that they're curious and open to us shaping the, the grant project, so to speak, 
more so than their-- they make very few demands.” G-204a 
 
Foundation Strategies: 
 Foundations reported several strategies they developed to reduce challenges related to 
opacity and power imbalances with grantees. These strategies seemed grantee-centered and 
driven by a genuine desire to enhance prospects for effective grant programs and achieve 
meaningful partnerships with strategic grantees. It is important to point out that these strategies 
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are not necessarily used by foundations in their interactions with all grantees. Instead, these 
strategies (especially as they compound on each other) appear to be selectively employed with 
grantees that foundations consider to be especially strategic.  
Like grantee strategies, foundations reported strategies that seemed sequential, layered, 
and interactive. The following summarizes strategies foundations reported that seemed to 
overcome challenges in their relationships with strategic grantees, which are related to opacity 
and/or imbalanced power. 
1. Relationship Building: Foundations reported that they intentionally showed their respect 
and appreciation for strategic grantees, which implied that such grantees were highly 
valued by their foundation partners. Foundations reported that they made conscious 
efforts to visit grantees where their programs are located to learn more about them and to 
acknowledge grantee significance. 
2. Enhancing Impact: Foundations invested in the capacity of strategic grantees, helping 
them grow and become increasingly sustainable entities. For this purpose, foundations 
dedicated time, attention and resources targeted at building capacity with grantees. 
Foundations demonstrated great flexibility in their grant making and reporting 
requirements to support grantee effectiveness and wellbeing.  
Foundations also invested effort in securing additional resources (e.g., recruiting 
other funders, engaging consultants, convening interested supporters/colleagues) for the 
benefit of grantees. These are described by grantees as intangible resources – not grants 
per se, but additional resources that derived from partnerships with foundations. Lastly, 
foundations reported that they used reporting to enhance accountability and learning from 
grants.  
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“It's relationship building. I couldn't have done that the first year I was here, or 
even the third or fourth year I was here. But you can see them building up 
overtime. And then also, we've had a couple of people, you know - now they've 
been here ten years - when they first got here, I had the chance to mentor, coach, 
and train with them also. And then I've also done mentoring and such.” FS-105 
 
“They've been excited about what we're doing, and, really, I think talked to lots of 
other people in the community and it wasn't just the conversations we had with 
them directly but, the people, I guess recommended us. And, they ended up doing, 
actually, like a service project at one of our apartment complexes where they 
brought in their own friends and family on a day to create a soccer field for this 
complex that we own that had lots of refugees and probably homeless that live 
there. At the end of the day they ended up committing $250,000 for a pilot project 
that we're rolling out to end poverty. That's a collaborative project with a 
university and some economic professors there. So, they were willing to commit to 
a three-year grant for that which is still kind of unusual around here and have 
also introduced us to lots of [other supporters].” G-107 
 
 
3. Partnership Development: At the partnership level of relationship, grantees and 
foundations reported that they enjoyed learning together from grant projects. Foundations 
demonstrated a significant tolerance for project failure so long as grantees were candid 
and timely about reporting such circumstances.  
Grantees seemed to experience foundations at this stage as being on their “team,” 
that foundations trusted grantees and were genuinely interested in learning from projects 
for the express purpose of improving subsequent grants. Grantees perceived foundations 
as genuinely caring about their agencies and personnel. In an effort to achieve 
meaningful, long-term relationships, foundations funded multiple grants (e.g., renewals 
of existing or new grants) to strategic grantees.  
 
“I’ve been working with some foundations that allow that – allow informality, 
they’ll treat you like an equal, listen to you and respect that your experiences are 
and I think that’s the difference I’m feeling between private and public [funders] – 
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I get that from private funders…they value my experience and our thoughts.” G-
102  
  
 Figure 5 
 
Ultimately, foundations treated strategic grantees more like valued partners – involving 
them in development of grant strategies, exercising flexibility in grant development and/or 
reporting requirements, engaging grantees in multiple grants for longer-term relationships and 
empowerment strategies such as use of agency site visits to acknowledge grantees and learn 
more about them. Perhaps most importantly is an apparent willingness to learn with grantees – 
providing a safe environment for grantees in which they can experiment and innovate. This 
involved a high tolerance for project failures. 
 
“So, for us at least, we're really love to work with partners that are willing to be 
by our side to go through these bold changes so long as they're willing to put 
things on the line as well, and kind of rethink, and re-strategize, and-- but it-- 
we're not for everybody, and we really know we're not for everybody. And, and so, 
that has been part of our trying to communicate with our community. You have to 
be willing to engage in this over-arching, um, philosophy strategy” FB-221 
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“I tell my, my partners all the time, you guys are the experts. That's why I'm here, 
to learn from you. This is a partnership." FS-107 
 
“All the new organizations get a site visit, and we go on those site visits most of 
the time with board members, at least one board member.” FS-351 
 
Emergent Theory 
Codes were developed to help interpret data consistent with findings in the literature, as 
well as new, emergent findings. A priori codes corresponded to variables described in Chapter 2 
and theoretical contexts introduced in Chapters 1 and 2. Emergent codes were developed 
consistent with unexpected observations in the data. While each code was tied to an applicable 
theory and research question, emergent codes did not have a specific corresponding theoretical 
framework. In Chapter 2, it was acknowledged that, depending upon the findings, an emergent, 
grounded theory might be needed. This turned out to be the case given the significant amount of 
data not sufficiently explained by a prior theory. 
When one is equipped with significant advantages and/or privileges relative to others, it 
is possible to respond through a sense of entitlement, as would be predicted consistent with 
MLT, or alternately with a heightened sense of vigilance. According to MLT, presumed 
prerogatives and/or perceived nobility/good behavior can encourage entitled behaviors, which 
could result in increasingly opaque practices that are ever less transparent to outsiders. It is 
possible that some foundations may engage in self-justified obscurity and secrecy, taking full 
advantage of the prerogatives afforded them under U.S. Tax Law and the enabling nature of both 
MLT and RDT.  
However, the foundation and grantee representatives interviewed for this research 
presented a very different set of foundation behaviors. Grantees observed that, consistent with 
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the tenants of opaque foundation practices, it can be very difficult to access and develop 
relationships with foundations. However, grantees reported that private foundations are more 
concerned with accountability than many other categories of grant making organizations. 
Further, when foundations and grantees successfully achieve a perceived alignment of mission 
and mutual trust, the data from this research suggested that it is possible that an alternative 
response to prerogatives enjoyed by foundations may occur.  
In this research, the prerogatives bestowed on private foundations appeared to stimulate a 
heightened sense of vigilance in foundation practice. Instead of entitlement/arrogance, significant 
attention was given to internally-imposed accountability and desires for good outcomes from 
grants, but also to strategies clearly intended to engage and support grantee partners. When a 
more partnership-oriented philanthropy occurs, foundations seem to act as genuinely concerned 
and committed partners. This seemed to be an intentional response to a sense of duty that may be 
triggered by, reciprocal to, the extent of discretion experienced by private foundations. For the 
purposes of this research, this condition has been named Burdened Prerogative Theory, which 
has been developed from grounded theory in an effort to explain the vigilant response to 
prerogatives observed in the data. 
 
Burdened Prerogative Theory is defined as a behavioral response to markedly high 
levels of unilateral discretion/prerogative resulting in vigilant conduct in fiduciary-
related orientation and intentional effort to ease differences in power in relationships 
with dependent/subordinate parties who are strategically aligned with one’s sense of 
purpose/mission. It stimulates a heightened sense of duty to achieve desired results 
associated with the level/source of privilege afforded resulting in a strong sense of 
alignment with, genuine empowerment of, less powerful, but important parties 
significantly associated with achieving desired results.     
 
 
Applying Burdened Prerogative Theory to the findings of this research provided a 
plausible explanation for foundation behaviors that are more grantee-centered than entitlement 
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and power driven. It posits that the prerogative itself can stimulate rectitude and a desire to 
empower strategic partners in a manner than supports and values them as valued constituents. 
Both foundation and grantee representatives interviewed in this research consistently described 
foundation conduct within the context of Burdened Prerogative Theory.  
Grantees confirmed their experience of feeling valued by their foundation partners and 
expressed significant confidence in such relationships. This experience was affirming to grantees 
that they were meaningful to their foundation partners. This included a kind of foundation-
grantee partnership analogous to angel investors and private equity where investors are willing to 
invest in risky ventures for potential significant gains and engage with, provide more than 
financial support for, their partners. 
 
“The intangibles [private foundations provide] are important. Leveraging their 
knowledge and contacts is the best of both worlds. They have a lot of experience and 
other resources to offer. I would go to private foundations first. So, it's the very same 
thing in the business world, you know. Angel investors [as with private foundations], 
right? You know, at each level [of financing], there's a different standard and willingness 
to help. And then in the last level, it's, you know, big bank. At each level there's a, there's 
a different standard [with respect to] your track record [expected results and level of 
risk].  I've had multiple people in the private foundation world say, listen, I'm less 
concerned about if it works or not. What I'm most concerned is what we learn. So, if it 
works and we learn something, that's absolutely fantastic. If it doesn't work, but we learn 
something, that's still a win.” I would say the angel investors are closest to the private 
foundations. Angel investors and possibly venture capital.” G-107  
 
“They treat you like family” G-402 
 
 
Observations from Foundation/Grantee Pairings 
In addition to findings from a rigorous data coding process, consistencies in information 
provided by paired foundations and grantees were captured and organized. Fourteen of the 
grantee representatives interviewed were paired with private foundations were also represented 
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in this research. This provided rich insights regarding perceptions of foundations and grantees 
relative to their interactions with each other.  
This section of Chapter 4 reports on commonalities in foundation and grantee observations. 
The next section reports on grantee observations that were not necessarily shared by their 
foundation counterparts. Common observations from foundation/grantee pairings confirmed 
many of the findings already reported in prior sections of this chapter.  
This was another important way to triangulate findings in this research. Observations 
reported from foundation/grantee pairings were highly consistent with findings previously 
reported. Common observations from the fourteen pairings of foundations and grantees are 
summarized below. 
1. Private foundations are thought to be highly relational, employing more of a human touch 
than bureaucratic processes. This is sometimes confusing to grantees, because gaining 
access to, and working with, private foundations is not merely a matter of reading a list of 
funding interests and filling out an application. Instead, gaining access requires a 
significant investment of time in getting to know foundation insiders well before 
submitting a proposal. 
2. Private foundations impose high levels of accountability on grantees. Grantees reported 
that foundations actually read their reports and want to understand them at a meaningful 
level. Accountability is not just an exercise, there seems to be a genuine intentionality 
about using accountability to enhance effectiveness and outcomes of grant projects.  
3. Private foundations are perceived as being more willing to take risks and open to learning 
with grantees. There seems to be a spirit of joint discovery and mutual commitment to 
learning. 
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4. Private foundations seem to be especially nimble, highly efficient and flexible grant 
makers. Grantees report that foundations respond timely to their proposals and can be 
flexible about a variety of grant requirements. 
5. Private foundations are intensely focused on achieving genuine outcomes from their 
grants. 
6. Private foundations are far less sensitive to outside pressures than other kinds of grant 
makers. Grantees believe foundations are free to make grants based upon their merits 
without concern about political consequences. Further, grantees find that they are not 
generally successful in asserting outside pressure to their advantage. They report that 
private foundations reject efforts at outside pressure on foundations Instead, it appears 
that grantees need to employ good prospecting, project alignment and engagement 
strategies to achieve genuine influence with foundations. 
7. Private foundations have significant expectations of grantees with respect to 
communication. Grantees believe that foundations want to know timely about significant 
developments, good or bad. 
8. Both grantees and many of the foundation representatives interviewed thought that 
private foundations tend not to share important insights gained from innovative grants 
with the broader philanthropic community. For example, several private foundations said 
they just don’t have the staffing to systematically disseminate information about their 
grants. Some suggested the field has failed to provide efficient ways to share information 
externally. However, some foundation representatives thought foundation associations 
provide sufficient mechanisms for this purpose. 
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9. A very interesting finding is that when private foundations are large (in terms of assets) 
and located a long distance from grantees, such foundations are considerably less 
relational and instead much more bureaucratic. 
10. Grantees and foundations agreed that large private foundations are easier to prospect. 
This is because large foundations tend to use technology more effectively and have 
stronger communications abilities. 
11. Despite being easier to prospect, foundations and grantees agreed that large private 
foundations are more difficult to access and to develop relationships with. 
12. Foundations and grantees generally agreed that an imbalance of power exists between 
them. They seemed to accept that this was merely a natural consequence of the resource-
intensity of foundations and resource-dependence of grantees. However, both reported 
that when grantees achieve strategic status, the ill-effects of this imbalance of power, 
similar to other issues related to opacity, become much less an issue. Grantees who 
viewing themselves as strategic thought the imbalance of power with foundations had 
become effectively irrelevant and were effectively neutralized. 
13. Despite a lack of sharing of important outcomes from grants externally, grantees and 
foundations were quickly able to cite important innovations made possible by foundation 
grants. This supports the finding that private foundations seek, and have achieved, 
important innovations in responding to society’s problems. 
Grantee Only Concerns 
The following are findings regarding grantee-only perspectives. These perspectives did not 
consistently emerge in foundation interviews. 
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1. Private foundation interests can change too quickly. While their nimbleness is admired 
and appreciated by grantees, an unwelcome consequence of the highly efficient and 
flexible nature of private foundations is that they can change grant interests prematurely, 
which is often viewed as being disruptive to grantees.   
2. Private foundations expect timely communication from grantees, but may fail to timely 
communicate changes in funding interests and/or other information important to grantees. 
Grantees cited circumstances where they had developed grant proposals based upon 
previously expressed foundation interests only to discover that unannounced changes had 
occurred making such proposals less relevant.  
3. Grantees reported that private foundations with which they are not familiar can be 
mysterious and difficult to access and to get to know. 
4. Grantees reported that their best relationships with private foundations are based upon a 
perceived alignment of interest and development of mutual trust. 
5. Once a meaningful relationship is developed, grantees overwhelmingly prefer working 
with private foundations compared to other grant making organizations. 
6. Grantees suggest that private foundations are intensely relational, care deeply about 
grantee organizations and personnel and offer much more than just grants including 
intangible resources. 
Emergence of Partnered Philanthropy 
 An unexpected finding from the interviews with foundation and grantee representatives 
was how different grantees may experience their interactions with foundations depending upon 
whether they are considered to be strategic. It is useful to recall that grantees become strategic to 
foundations when an alignment of mission and development of mutual trust are achieved. It was 
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apparent that the process of becoming a strategic grantee is both involved and requires initiative 
by grantees in achieving access and alignment of mission.  
Achieving strategic grantee status seemed to obviate some challenges related to opacity 
and imbalanced power. Further, this also appears to catalyze positive changes in foundation 
behavior toward grantees. Getting to this point in relationship development requires initiative 
and an investment of time by both foundations and grantees with respect to achieving mutual 
trust, which leads to the emergence of a genuine sense of partnered philanthropy.  
Partnered philanthropy seemed to involve a desire by foundations and grantees to work 
together in a fashion that demonstrates mutual respect, appreciation and value. Further, both 
foundations and grantees seemed to have mutually interest in experimenting, learning together 
and enhancing effectiveness of grant projects. In these partnerships, the positive outcomes from 
opacity seemed to be preserved, but additional beneficial dynamics also emerged. This seemed to 
mute negative effects of opacity and imbalanced power while preserving advantages made 
possible by opacity in private philanthropy. This presumed that grantees effectively implemented 
strategies identified in this research and that foundation behavior was catalyzed by Burdened 
Prerogative Theory rather than entitlement. 
These seemed to represent unintended benefits associated with opaque foundation 
practice. Such benefits are, however, the result of voluntary attitudes and behaviors of foundation 
insiders. Such foundations attitudes and behaviors seemed reasonably explained by Burdened 
Prerogative Theory, which emerged from the development of grounded theoretical approach. An 
emergent theory was needed, because foundation behavior discovered in this research regarding 
opacity and imbalanced power are so different than what was in the private foundation literature. 
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Furthermore, neither MLT nor RDT provided reasonable explanatory capability with regard to 
certain discoveries in this research.  
Partnership-oriented foundation attitudes and behaviors discovered in this research may 
not be consistently practiced across all private foundations. However, the findings in this 
research were generally consistent across all 33 foundations represented. Further, not all grantees 
may experience partnership orientations with foundations as suggested herein, because they may 
not have achieved sufficient access, alignment of mission and/or mutual trust. Figure 6 illustrates 
the sequence of events that appear to be conditions precedent to partnered philanthropy.  
 
Figure 6 
 
Overwhelmingly, the grantees interviewed seemed to enjoy strategic status with the 
foundations in which they were paired. It was interesting that all grantees had experiences with 
multiple private foundations, as well as other kinds of grant making organizations. So, grantees 
were able to contribute informed commentary on their relationships with private foundations in 
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which they have achieved strategic status by comparison to experiences with foundations in 
which such status was not achieved, as well as other categories of grant makers. 
Conclusion 
While transparency seems an inherently noble and worthy objective, one must be careful 
about deciding when, where and how it should be enhanced and/or enforced. In the case of 
private philanthropy, it appears that a lack of transparency may actually contribute to the ability 
to pursue important grant projects that might not be politically popular, take risks for the 
purposes of seeking innovation, enjoy a healthy tolerance for failure and permit greater 
intentionality and focus on grant interests specific to each foundation. The findings in this 
research suggest that transparency is not always useful to purposeful work and may actually 
impede some important progress (Briscoe & Murphy, 2012, Hannan, Polos, Carroll, 2003).  
By contrast to findings in the private foundation literature, the foundations and grantees 
interviewed consistently expressed considerable enthusiasm for working with each other. 
Grantees acknowledged the opaque nature of private philanthropy impedes access and made 
developing meaningful relationships time and effort-intensive.  
Grantees have developed specific strategies to overcome barriers to access to, and for 
developing trusting relationships with private foundations. Interestingly, once grantees achieve 
an alignment of interest and establish a meaningful level of trust with private foundations, 
foundations also engaged in strategies intended to enhance relationships with grantees. Further, 
foundations reportedly engaged strategic grantees in a fashion analogous to relationships in the 
private equity sphere where many resources (in addition to capital) are provided with the goal of 
doing everything possible to encourage successful outcomes.  Challenges associated with opacity 
and coexisting imbalanced power seem to dissipate for strategic grantees and private foundations 
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under the conditions of partnered philanthropy, which seemed to catalyze foundations in 
becoming intensely committed to grantee success and engaging in a series of behaviors 
conducive to achieving a genuine sense of partnered philanthropy with such grantees. 
Several findings from this research are different than what was discovered in the private 
foundation literature. While opacity and many of the problems it can create were clearly present 
in the findings, many findings suggested that foundations and grantees (at least strategic 
grantees) are working together effectively and in a manner that emphasized mutual respect, 
appreciation and value. Interestingly, strategic grantees reported that they preferred working with 
private foundations over other kinds of grant making organizations. However, grantees did not 
experience similar positive working relationships with foundations that were both large and 
distal.  
“So, both [a large national foundation] and [a large out of state regional foundation] have 
gotten more bureaucratic and less easy to work with. [The local foundation] is very easy 
to work with. [The large national foundation] being the hardest, [the large out of state 
regional foundation] being about less hard, and [the local] being the easiest.” G-122 
 
“It's a lot more difficult with a foundation that's out of state and more a national 
focus….It's more difficult.” G-204b 
 
Based upon this research, it would seem important to avoid painting private foundations 
with a broad brush with respect to behaviors related to opacity and imbalanced power. Evidence 
from this research suggested that many foundations seem to act as faithful stewards of the tax-
advantaged funds they oversee, seek to achieve meaningful benefits for society and utilize the 
privileges of opacity in ways that are instrumental to effective philanthropy.   
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Implications and Limitations 
 
Introduction 
This research explored the existence and effects of opacity within the context of private 
philanthropy. Consistent with concerns regarding corporations (Kelly 2009), the private 
foundation literature called for greater transparency in private philanthropy (Fleishman 2007, 
Ostrander 2007, Leat 2006). Yet, the literature did not define opacity nor did it comprehensively 
explore private foundation opaque practices.  
Private philanthropy provided a unique context for studying issues related to opacity, because 
it operates in an exclusively private manner but manages tax-advantaged funds. This conundrum 
of private organizations versus the right of the public to know how tax-advantaged funds are 
being used brings forward transparency and opacity related issues in a powerful way. 
This study defined opacity within the context of private philanthropy and provided a rich 
exploration of opacity-related issues. Insights generated by this research can be helpful to both 
practitioners and policymakers in considering issues related to opacity and transparency within 
the context of both corporate and social institutions. 
Sandy (2007) asserted that private foundations are among the least accountable social 
institutions in the United States. However, this assertion was based principally upon measures of 
external accountability, not internal practices regarding accountability. This study contributed to 
a more complete exploration of private foundation practices regarding accountability.  
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Boldouc, Buchanan and Buteau (2007) cited serious problems with respect to private 
foundation-grantee relations, which seemed related to opaque foundation practices and an 
imbalance of power between foundations and grantees.  Boldouc, Buchanan and Buteau (2007) 
prompted greater awareness of issues related to foundation-grantee relations with grantee 
perception surveys. However, to achieve a deeper understanding of important contextual issues 
related to foundation-grantee relations, a qualitative study was needed.   
While the literature raised serious concerns about private philanthropy, it did not provide a 
theoretical framework to enhance understanding of these concerns or explain how such 
challenges might be overcome. This research provided theoretical contributions by exploring two 
existing theories (e.g., MLT, RDT) to help understand observations in the private foundation 
literature and developing grounded theory (e.g., Burdened Prerogative Theory) to explain 
observed foundation behaviors that were different than what would have been predicted based 
upon the private foundation literature.  
Based upon the private foundation literature, it could have been reasonably expected that this 
research would merely confirm concerns cited regarding opacity, imbalanced power and 
foundation-grantee relations. In fact, the existence of opacity in private philanthropy was 
confirmed as were certain related negative consequences.  
The research findings also identified important positive outcomes made possible by opacity 
and discovered intentional foundation behaviors that demonstrated both a strong commitment to 
significant internal accountability and to enhancement of grantee relations. These were 
unexpected findings that involved contextual positive circumstances that are important to 
understand for the purposes of effective public policy regarding private philanthropy and 
nonprofit practice. 
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This was a large research project, especially for a qualitative study, involving 33 foundations, 
16 grantees, 51 interviews and confirmation of findings with six domain experts. Four research 
questions were developed to guide an exploration of opacity, organizational/environmental 
factors that lead to opacity, specific consequences of opacity and strategies foundations and 
grantees had developed to overcome challenges that arise from opacity and imbalanced power.  
It may seem reasonable that the public has a right to know what is happening with the 
management of tax-advantaged funds inside private philanthropy. However, the privacy 
literature points out that achieving transparency can impose potentially significant costs 
(Hannan, Polos, Carroll, 2003). In the case of private philanthropy, it was discovered that opaque 
practices are used by foundations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness in their grant 
making. Fleishman (2007) predicted the policymakers may impose greater transparency 
requirements on private foundations. The findings from this research raise questions about the 
advisability of such a potential change in public policy. 
The following portions of this chapter are divided into five sections. First, the existence 
and importance of opacity is discussed. Second, the significance of the negative and positive 
consequences of opacity is explored. Third, the need for foundation and grantee strategies in 
overcoming challenges related to opacity and imbalanced power is acknowledged. Fourth, 
contributions to management, nonprofit practice and theory are described. Lastly, limitations and 
need for additional research are detailed. 
Existence and Importance of Opacity 
Chapter 4 reported five specific findings strongly supporting evidence that private 
philanthropy is practiced in significantly opaque circumstances. Taken together, these 
observations in the data are strongly indicative of a domain that enjoys a markedly highly level 
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of opacity/insularity. While private philanthropy was found to be significantly opaque, 
understanding opacity within the context of this domain is nuanced by circumstances unique to 
the field. This has to do with the fact that private foundations manage tax-advantaged funds, but 
such funds are completely derived from private contributions.  
Analysis of data from this research involved an exploration of possible applications of 
MLT and RDT in enhancing understanding of opaque foundation practices. The data did not 
support expectations regarding entitlement-related foundation behaviors as might have been 
expected within the context of MLT. However, it was clear that RDT does have a significant 
influence with respect to encouraging opaque foundation practices. It was evident that elevated 
power associated with being resource-intense entities enabled foundations to engage in opaque 
practices. Emergent theory was needed to more comprehensively explain private foundation 
behaviors that were unexpected based upon the private foundation literature. 
Foundations reported that they enjoyed considerable discretion with respect to what, how 
and when they choose to fund. They did not perceive the need to account publicly for their grant 
decisions or for outcomes achieved. Grantees did not question the right of foundations to make 
grant-related decisions or challenge the making of such decisions in private settings. 
Opacity is also enabled by deferential legislative policies regarding private foundations. 
Foundations described their legal restrictions as minimal and ostensibly non-intrusive. 
Considerable latitude is afforded private foundations under U.S. law. It seems that interacting 
effects of disparate power induced by RDT and a highly deferential regulatory environment 
contribute significantly to the inducement of opacity within private philanthropy.     
The narrative regarding opacity and transparency in private philanthropy is complicated 
by the question of whether private foundations exist in the public domain. Does the fact that the 
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funds managed by foundations are entirely the subject of private contributions put private 
foundations outside the public sphere? Or does the fact that the funds private foundations 
manage are tax-advantaged place them in the public sphere?  
These are complicated questions, but it seems that private philanthropy exists somewhere 
between the public and private contexts in that they are privately funded but are also subject to 
public policy (e.g., required level of annual distributions, restricted to charitable activity, 
prohibition of self-dealing) in a way that completely private entities are not. Thus, the concept 
and context of opacity in private philanthropy is complicated and anything, but straightforward. 
Opacity clearly presents challenges, especially to interested outsiders who cannot see into 
and/or understand foundations and their activities. Further, opacity seems to aggravate 
challenges related to imbalanced power between collaborating entities. Collaborating entities are 
likely to possess disparate power. Understanding opacity and its effects on co-existing 
imbalanced power could be very helpful to both practitioners and policymakers. 
Importance of Negative and Positive Consequences of Opacity 
 Negative consequences of opaque foundation practices observed included a pattern of 
difficulty with respect to access, rapid changes in grant interests and ineffective, occasionally 
non-existent, external communication. These negative opacity-related challenges are of great 
concern to nonprofits who seek grants from private foundations.  
However, it may not be necessary for private philanthropy to provide an open access 
process similar to public grant makers. Findings suggest that there are contexts in which 
foundations and grantees enjoy particularly effective relationships. Given the propensity of 
private foundations to pursue innovative grantee partners and grant projects, it seems that 
selection of grantee partners may be especially important to foundations. Barriers to access and 
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required rigors related to relationship development may serve as filtering mechanisms, 
permitting only the most persevering and qualified grantees to achieve meaningful relationships 
with foundations. Grantees who succeeded in developing meaningful relationships with private 
foundations reported that the benefits of such relationships were worth the effort and time 
required to achieve them.     
 The opaque circumstances in which foundations operate also create several interesting 
and important advantages over public grant making entities. Such opacity-facilitated advantages 
included the privacy in which to make controversial but important grant decisions, ability to 
support grantees with a healthy tolerance for potential failure, capacity to take risks in pursuit of 
innovation and a nimbleness/flexibility to quickly adapt to changing circumstances. These are 
not trivial advantages enjoyed by private philanthropy. Both foundations and grantees 
acknowledged the existence and importance of these advantages, which are made possible out of 
the opaque circumstances of private philanthropy. 
Necessity of Grantee and Foundation Strategies 
 Given reported challenges arising out of opaque foundation practices, grantees need 
highly effective strategies to gain access to, develop perceived mutuality of mission with and 
inspire trust by foundations. Without effective strategies for such objectives, nonprofits are 
unlikely to access and/or develop meaningful relationships with private foundations.  
In this regard, grantees reported that effective prospecting strategies helped overcome 
challenges related to foundation inaccessibility. They also reported they had developed strategies 
in repackaging their projects in a fashion more likely to be viewed as aligned with foundation 
interests and values, and subsequently developing/maintaining perceived trustworthiness.  
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 Interestingly, foundations also reported that they perceived the need for strategies to 
enhance their relationships with grantees. It seemed that grantees perceived by foundations as 
especially strategic were more likely to consistently benefit from such strategies. Foundation 
strategies focused on relationship building, enhancing impact and enabling effective 
partnerships.  
Foundations and grantees both reported that they enjoyed opportunities to 
experiment/innovate, learn with each other and were more willing to be mutually accountable in 
expanding impact from grants. Faithful execution of both foundation and grantee strategies was 
necessary to achieve a status discovered in this research, herein referred to as partnered 
philanthropy.  
Partnered philanthropy seemed to occur when both foundations and grantees experienced a 
strong sense of mutual purpose, value, trust and respect. When these attributes existed, both 
parties appeared to perceive grant making as a genuine partnership exercise in which each has 
meaningful input in developing strategies/tactics and a sense of ownership relative to such 
charitable ventures. Characterized by pronounced high levels of mutual trust, partnered 
philanthropy involved a willingness by foundations and grantees to learn together when 
experimenting in an effort to expand impact. These are conditions generally considered essential 
to effective inter-organizational collaboration (Porter & Kramer, 1999). 
Under the conditions of partnered philanthropy, the foundations in this research overwhelmingly 
engaged in behaviors not expected based upon the existing private foundation literature. Instead of acting 
as a secret society, foundations willingly lowered the curtain of opacity for, and empowered, strategic 
grantees as valued partners. In this context, foundations became highly engaged in supporting both the 
projects they funded and the wellbeing of grantee organizations. Grantees reported that foundations 
provided important contributions to their work above and beyond the grants they made. This included 
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assistance in securing additional financial support, access to content experts and providing valuable 
advice and consultation, as well as employing flexibility with respect to grant requirements.  
Such behaviors required a grounded theoretical framework to better understand and explain, since 
they were unexpected under existing theory. Neither MLT nor RDT could help explain these 
unexpected foundation behaviors. These voluntary behaviors were clearly not prompted by 
entitlement or disparate power. Instead, they were aligned with a sense of genuine benevolence and 
commitment to both grant outcomes and grantee wellbeing. They demonstrated both a sense of 
internally-generated accountability for achieving positive outcomes for public good and an 
appreciation for grantee partners. These behaviors were markedly different than what had been found 
in the private foundation literature and they required a new theoretical framework to sufficiently 
understand. This led to the emergence of Burdened Prerogative Theory, which represents a significant 
contribution in better understanding certain foundation behaviors within the context of opacity.   
Contributions to Management, Nonprofit Practice and Theory 
 There are several contributions to management, nonprofit practice and theory that arise 
out of the findings from this research.  
Contributions to Management 
At least two contributions to management were made by this research. They are as follows.  
1. Implications for Supervision of Frontline Employees: Inter-firm collaboration is intensely 
relational (Bresnen & Marshall 2001). Collaboration between collaborating entities is 
typically realized through the interaction between frontline employees (Ploetner & Ehert 
2005). Managers/supervisors need to closely monitor frontline employee interactions 
within the context of collaboration-related priorities, especially where conditions of 
opacity and/or imbalanced power are present. More opaque/powerful firms may need to 
intentionally sensitize their frontline employees to enhance their respect, trust and valuing 
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for frontline employees of less powerful firms in order to achieve greater value from 
them. Foundation practices described in Chapter 4 may be useful in this regard. 
2. Differentiating Importance of Potential Partners: It may be important to differentiate 
between strategic and non-strategic partnering firms when emphasizing collaboration-
enhancing strategies. Not all partners represent equal value within the context of firm 
priorities. The process by which foundations and grantees achieve strategic partnerships 
could be useful to management practitioners.   
Contributions to Nonprofit Practice 
There are at least three contributions regarding nonprofit practice that emerge from this 
research: 
1. Public Policy Regarding Transparency: This research discovered that at least some 
private foundations utilize opacity to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of their 
grant making. Further, insights gained from foundation participants in this study showed 
no evidence of entitlement-related conduct or misuse of the prerogatives enjoyed under 
the applicable law or disparate power related to resource-intensity. To the contrary, these 
foundations were intensely focused on achieving increasingly greater public benefit. 
According to the grantees interviewed, private foundations seemed to be even more 
focused on achieving meaningful outcomes than other categories of grant makers. If 
policymakers were to impose greater transparency requirements on private foundations, it 
could adversely affect unique contributions to society by private foundations made 
possible by conditions of opacity, as well as willingness of future donors to create 
foundations.     
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2. Foundation Strategies: The broader private philanthropic community could learn from 
foundation strategies discovered in this research for the purposes of enhancing grantee 
relations. Grantee verification of the positive effects of such strategies suggested they 
represent foundation-related best practices. 
3. Grantee Strategies: Grantees provided valuable insights regarding how they improve 
access to, align missions with and become increasingly trusted by foundations. These 
strategies can be viewed as best practices among nonprofits when interacting with private 
foundations. 
Theoretical Contributions 
There are two theoretical contributions from this research. 
1. Use of RDT in Explaining Disparate Power: This research used RDT to explain 
observations in the literature that can be attributed to disparate power between 
foundations and grantees. Existence of disparate foundation power was substantiated in 
interviews with both foundations and grantees. However, interviewees consistently 
observed that the effects of disparate power dissipated under conditions of improved 
foundation-grantee relations. This observation was not anticipated in the literature and 
seemed inconsistent with tenants of RDT, further supporting the need for emergent 
theory. 
2. Use of Grounded Theory – Burdened Prerogative Theory: There was no evidence of 
MLT-related entitlement behavior by foundation participants in this study. Given that 
MLT ultimately proved not useful in explaining private foundation practice, emergent 
theory was even more needed to explain observed behaviors that would not have been 
expected based upon the existing private foundation literature. Accordingly, emergent 
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theory derived from this research helped explain why people afforded with great privilege 
and discretion and an absence of significant external accountability seem to act in a 
fashion that is highly vigilant rather than entitled. When given circumstances where 
private parties are afforded considerable discretion in overseeing wealth without 
significant external accountability, one of two responses might be expected to occur.  
a. One response might be a self-serving, entitled attitude of privilege (Klotz & 
Bolino, 2013). Related observations from the private foundation literature focused 
seemed to be born out of opacity and RDT in private philanthropy. Measures of 
transparency might guard against this potential (Jennings, Mitchell, Hannah, 
2014).  
b. However, an alternate response was observed, one of vigilance reciprocal to the 
extent of privilege experienced. Burdened Prerogative Theory was developed to 
help explain this alternate behavior. This observed alternate response to privilege 
represented an unexpected finding, but was highly consistent throughout the 51 
interviews.  
Limitations 
Caution should be exercised when transferring the findings from this research to the entire 
field of private philanthropy. Research is inescapably contextual. Accordingly, the findings 
reported herein should be considered within the specific context of this research, including some 
of the following limitations. 
This was a relatively large study with 33 foundations and 51 interviews. There was 
considerable diversity in size and geographical location of foundations and grantees is 
represented in this research. However, willingness to participate in this kind of research may 
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constitute some form of self-selection in the sample. Great effort was dedicated to achieving a 
reasonable purposive sampling, but it is still possible that the foundations in this study may not 
be fully representative of the entire field. Willingness to participate in research such as this might 
correlate with a more intrinsically collaborative nature that could lend itself to greater 
partnership orientation. It is, however, important to note that all foundation participants were 
recruited by intermediaries (foundation associations) and that nearly two-thirds of the 
foundations recruited agreed to participate suggesting a fairly significant and consistent level of 
openness to collaborating with this research. 
It may also be possible that foundations who participate in professional associations could be 
more outwardly oriented and inherently less opaque. However, the findings from this research 
showed considerable evidence of opacity consistent with observations in the literature (Sandy 
2007, Ostrander 2007, Leat 2006). An unexpected finding was that when alignment of mission 
and the development of mutual trust were achieved, effects of opacity and imbalanced power 
seemed to dissipate.   
Foundations can be highly unique in their interests, philosophies and conduct. It is possible 
that some foundations may conduct themselves in ways different than as represented by the 
findings in this study. However, the findings from foundation representatives were highly 
consistent, providing compelling evidence that the observations from this research may be 
reasonably transferrable to a larger context. However, grantee participants reported that 
foundation conduct is markedly different with larger, more remotely located foundations. This 
may also account for some differences in the findings from this research when compared to the 
existing private foundation literature.  
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It is possible that focus on foundations largely located in the Southwest could induce certain 
cultural orientations that might affect attitudes and behaviors between foundations and grantees 
by comparison to other regions. However, seven foundation participants were located outside the 
Southwest and the findings associated with these foundations were highly consistent with those 
of other participating foundations. Grantee representatives outside the Southwest were also 
interviewed. Further, findings from this research were shared with domain experts, some of 
which were also located outside the Southwest. All of the domain experts (four foundation and 
two grantee experts) confirmed the findings from this research, which would seem to support 
both the trustworthiness and transferability of findings herein.  
Needed Future Research 
This study suggested there may be significant differences in how large, non-local 
foundations behave by comparison to small to medium-sized foundations that are more 
proximally located to grantees. While this observation emerged from this research, it was not 
studied. Differences in foundation behavior by scale and proximity should be specifically 
studied. 
Another finding not sufficiently studied herein was the observation that private 
foundations too often fail to share valuable outcomes and innovations with the broader 
philanthropic community. The causes of this failure within private philanthropy and options for 
achieving more meaningful sharing of important grant outcomes should be further studied. 
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Appendix A 
Interview Guide for Foundation Board Members 
 
Demographic Information (to be completed ahead of the interview): 
Interview number: 
Gender: 
Name of foundation: 
Size of foundation: 
Website: 
Questions for Interview: 
1. I’d like know more about your involvement in the foundation. Can you tell me a about 
your participation with this foundation? How long have you been part of the foundation? 
 
Possible further probing: Did you know the donor, his/her family, or other board 
members before serving on the board?  
 
2. Let’s talk about your foundation. I’d like to understand how board members appointed 
and their terms. Can you help clarify this for me? 
 
Possible further probing: Are there outside stakeholders such as grantees on your 
board?  
 
3. Can you help me understand the key stakeholders in the foundation? Who are the 
important parties to the foundation?  
 
Possible further probing: If outside stakeholders, can you provide examples?  
 
4. Let’s talk a bit about your grant strategies. Who is involved in the grant decision making 
in your foundation? 
 
Possible further probing: How much discretion does your foundation possess in 
making grant decisions?  
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5. Have you experienced outside pressures with respect to grant making? If so, how have 
such outside pressures affected your grant making? 
 
Possible further probing: Can you provide examples of outside pressure you’ve 
experienced? 
 
Possible further probing: Does your foundation publicly disclose the grants it 
makes?  If so, how is this done? Does the foundation routinely share the results of 
its grants with others? 
 
6. In your experience, are there advantages to the private nature of your foundation 
compared to other funders?  Can you provide examples? 
 
Possible further probing: Have you experienced disadvantages from the private 
nature of your foundation compared to other funders?  Can you provide 
examples? 
 
7. How do you think the non-public nature of private foundations affects decisions about:  
 
1) Who to fund?  
 
2) Your funding objectives?  
 
8. What kinds of grant projects would you consider to be especially risky? Have you funded 
some of those?  Can you provide examples? 
 
Possible further probe: What is your impression about the relationship between 
grant projects with significant risk of failure and potential for innovation?  
 
Possible further probe: How would you describe your foundation’s attitudes 
about risks in grant making? 
 
9. Looking at the matter of key stakeholders, let’s step back – earlier I asked about your 
thoughts regarding key stakeholders.  I’m interested in better understanding possible 
imbalances of power with grantees.  Some foundations consider grantees as stakeholders. 
So, it would be helpful to talk a little about your foundation’s relationship with grantees. 
 
1) How would you assess the relationship between the foundation and its 
grantees? 
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2) What is your experience with respect to a possible imbalance of power 
between the foundation and its grantees? 
 
3) Have you developed specific strategies to overcome concerns about such an 
imbalance of power? 
 
10. Your foundation has done some great work.  How do you share information about grant 
outcomes with others outside the foundation? 
 
11. Is there anything else you would like to add to your comments before we end this 
interview? 
  
Wrap-Up Comments: 
Once again, thank you for your time, candor, and contributions to this research.  Your 
comments will be helpful in pursuing this inquiry.  
 
1. May I summarize key takeaways from this interview to be sure I understand your 
thoughts accurately? 
 
2. Would you be willing to respond to a follow-up call if additional questions arise as I 
reflect on your comments?  
 
3. Please feel free to contact me at rjreid@okstate.edu or 575-318-8089 if you have 
additional thoughts to share and/or questions regarding our project.   
 
4. Do you have any questions before we conclude this interview? 
 
5. Is there anyone else, inside the foundation or a grantee, you think I should contact? 
 
6. Once again, thank you for your time and assistance, this concludes our interview. 
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Appendix B 
Interview Guide for Foundation Staff 
 
Demographic Information (to be completed ahead of the interview): 
Interview number: 
Gender: 
Name of foundation: 
Size of foundation: 
Position: 
Website: 
Questions for Interview: 
1. I’d like know more about your involvement in the foundation. Can you tell me a about 
your participation with this foundation? How long have you been part of the foundation? 
 
Possible further probing: Did you know the donor, his/her family, or other board 
members before serving on the board?  
 
2. Let’s talk about your foundation. I’d like to understand how board members appointed 
and their terms. Can you help clarify this for me? 
 
Possible further probing: Are there outside stakeholders such as grantees on your 
board?  
 
3. Can you help me understand the key stakeholders in the foundation? Who are the 
important parties to the foundation?  
 
Possible further probing: If outside stakeholders, can you provide examples?  
 
4. Let’s talk a bit about your grant strategies. Who is involved in the grant decision making 
in your foundation? 
 
Possible further probing: How much discretion does your foundation possess in 
making grant decisions?  
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5. Have you experienced outside pressures with respect to grant making? If so, how have 
such outside pressures affected your grant making? 
 
Possible further probing: Can you provide examples of outside pressure you’ve 
experienced? 
 
Possible further probing: Does your foundation publicly disclose the grants it 
makes?  If so, how is this done? Does the foundation routinely share the results of 
its grants with others? 
 
6. In your experience, are there advantages to the private nature of your foundation 
compared to other funders?  Can you provide examples? 
 
Possible further probing: Have you experienced disadvantages from the private 
nature of your foundation compared to other funders?  Can you provide 
examples? 
 
7. How do you think the non-public nature of private foundations affects decisions about:  
 
1) Who to fund?  
 
2) Your funding objectives?  
 
8. What kinds of grant projects would you consider to be especially risky? Have you funded 
some of those?  Can you provide examples? 
 
Possible further probe: What is your impression about the relationship between 
grant projects with significant risk of failure and potential for innovation?  
 
Possible further probe: How would you describe your foundation’s attitudes 
about risks in grant making? 
 
9. Looking at the matter of key stakeholders, let’s step back – earlier I asked about your 
thoughts regarding key stakeholders.  I’m interested in better understanding possible 
imbalances of power with grantees.  Some foundations consider grantees as stakeholders. 
So, it would be helpful to talk a little about your foundation’s relationship with grantees. 
 
4) How would you assess the relationship between the foundation and its 
grantees? 
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5) What is your experience with respect to a possible imbalance of power 
between the foundation and its grantees? 
 
6) Have you developed specific strategies to overcome concerns about such an 
imbalance of power? 
10. Your foundation has done some great work.  How do you share information about grant 
outcomes with others outside the foundation? 
 
11. Is there anything else you would like to add to your comments before we end this 
interview? 
  
Wrap-Up Comments: 
Once again, thank you for your time, candor, and contributions to this research.  Your 
comments will be helpful in pursuing this inquiry.  
 
1. May I summarize key takeaways from this interview to be sure I understand your 
thoughts accurately? 
 
2. Would you be willing to respond to a follow-up call if additional questions arise as I 
reflect on your comments?  
 
3. Please feel free to contact me at rjreid@okstate.edu or 575-318-8089 if you have 
additional thoughts to share and/or questions regarding our project.   
 
4. Do you have any questions before we conclude this interview? 
 
5. Is there anyone else, inside the foundation or a grantee, you think I should contact? 
 
6. Once again, thank you for your time and assistance, this concludes our interview. 
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Appendix C 
Interview Guide for Grantee Representatives 
 
Demographic Information (to be gathered in advance of interview): 
Interview number: 
Gender: 
Name of grantee organization: 
Approximate number of foundation grants received: 
Number of years on the staff: 
Agency website: 
Questions for Interview: 
1. How long have been working with this agency?  Have you worked with other nonprofits? 
 
2. How frequently have you approached foundations for possible funding? 
 
3. Have you received grants from one or more foundations? 
 
Possible further probing: Can you share with me examples of foundation grants 
you’ve received? 
  
Possible further probing: Who do you typically seek out for grants? Who is the 
most accessible out there as a funder? 
 
4. Let’s talk about the grant process. What has been your experience in working with 
private foundations compared to other kinds of funders?  
 
Possible further Probing: Are private foundations easier or more difficult to work 
with? How and in what ways? 
 
5. Are private foundations easier or more difficult to understand than other kinds of funders 
in terms of their grant making interests and decisions?  
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6. When would you prefer to approach for a grant - private foundations versus other kinds 
of funders? 
 
Possible further Probing: How is it like to work with private foundations once you 
get a grant? How do they treat you? 
 
7. How does the private nature of private foundations affect your thoughts about when and 
how to approach them with possible funding requests? 
 
Further Probing: How is the private context of private foundations beneficial or 
harmful to grantees? 
 
8. Are you aware of important innovations emerging from foundation grants? 
 
Further probing: When innovations emerge, how do foundations share such 
outcomes with outside concerns? Can you describe how an innovation was shared 
externally by a foundation?  
 
9. How do your strategies in working with private foundations vary by comparison to other 
kinds of funders? 
 
10. In your experiences in working and interacting with private foundations, do you feel like 
you are on an equal standing with them? 
 
11. If you have experienced an imbalance of power with private foundations, have you 
developed strategies for dealing with this? Have these strategies been effective? 
    
12. When you are seeking to innovate with unproven initiatives are you more or less likely to 
approach private foundations compared to other funders for funding? 
 
Further Probing: Are private foundations more or less able/willing than other 
funders to fund risky projects? 
 
13. Who influences private foundation in grant making? What are your thoughts about the 
extent to which foundations experience, and respond to, external pressures regarding their 
grant making?   
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Possible further probing: Have you seen examples of private foundation grant 
making that resulted from external pressure? 
 
Possible further probing: How do your strategies in grant seeking change when 
approaching private foundations? 
 
14. Have the foundations from which you have received grants publicly disclosed the grants 
it makes?  If so, how is this done?  
 
15. Is there anything you’d like to add to your comments? 
 
Wrap-Up Comments: 
Once again, thank you for your time, candor, and contributions to this research.  Your 
comments will be helpful in pursuing this inquiry.  
 
1. May I summarize key takeaways from this interview to be sure I understand your 
thoughts accurately? 
 
2. Would you be willing to respond to a follow-up call if additional questions arise as I 
reflect on your comments?  
 
3. Please feel free to contact me at rjreid@okstate.edu or 575-318-8089 if you have 
additional thoughts to share and/or questions regarding our project.   
 
4. Do you have any questions before we conclude this interview? 
 
5. Is there anyone else you think I should contact? 
 
6. Once again, thank you for your time and assistance, this concludes our interview. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Opacity of Private Philanthropy 
 
 
118 
 
 
 
 
Appendix D 
Existence of Opacity Coding Summary 
Existence of Opacity 
    
Codes A Priori Codes Axial Codes Selective Codes 
Research 
Question 
Inaccessibility Power – RDT Internal Stakeholders 
No Outside 
Constituents 
Existence of 
Opacity 
     Insensitivity to 
External Pressure Power - RDT/MLT Internal Stakeholders 
No Outside 
Constituents 
Positive effects of 
Opacity 
     Self-
Appointed/Sustained 
Boards Power – MLT Unilateral Prerogatives 
No Outside 
Constituents 
Existence of 
Opacity 
     
Insider Staff Power – MLT Unilateral Prerogatives 
No Outside 
Constituents 
Existence of 
Opacity 
     Non-External Sharing 
of Outcomes Power – MLT Internal Stakeholders 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Negative effects 
of Opacity 
     
Controlling Behavior Power – RDT Unilateral Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Negative effects 
of Opacity 
     Discretionary Grant 
Making Power - RDT/MLT Unilateral Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Positive effects of 
Opacity 
     
Focus on Outcomes Hyper Vigilance Unilateral Prerogatives 
Burdened 
Prerogative 
Theory 
Positive effects of 
Opacity 
     
Greater Flexibility 
Lack of 
Bureaucracy Internal Stakeholders 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Positive effects of 
Opacity 
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Codes Emergent Codes Axial Codes Selective Codes 
Research 
Question 
     
Desire to Innovate Hyper Vigilance Unilateral Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Unintended 
Benefits 
     Partnership 
Orientation Hyper Vigilance Unilateral Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Unintended 
Benefits 
     
Intangible Resources Hyper Vigilance Unilateral Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Unintended 
Benefits 
     Human Touch with 
Grantees Hyper Vigilance Unilateral Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Unintended 
Benefits 
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Appendix E 
Organizational/Environmental Factors Coding Summary 
 
Environmental and Organizational Factors 
  
Codes 
A Priori 
Codes Axial Codes Selective Codes Research Question 
Insensitivity to 
External Pressure Power - RDT 
Internal 
Stakeholders 
No Outside 
Constituents 
Organizational & 
Environmental 
Factors 
     Self-
Appointed/Sustained 
Boards Power 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
No Outside 
Constituents 
Organizational & 
Environmental 
Factors 
     
Insider Staff Power 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
No Outside 
Constituents 
Organizational & 
Environmental 
Factors 
     
Controlling Behavior Power - RDT 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Organizational & 
Environmental 
Factors 
     
Discretionary Grant 
Making Power - RDT 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Organizational & 
Environmental 
Factors 
     
Insider Chemistry 
(board/staff) Power - RDT 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
No Outside 
Constituents 
Organizational & 
Environmental 
Factors 
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Appendix F 
Negative Effects of Opacity Coding Summary 
Negatives of Opacity 
    
Codes A Priori Codes Axial Codes Selective Codes 
Research 
Question 
Poor External 
Communication Power - RDT/MLT 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Negative 
effects of 
Opacity 
     
Quick Changes in 
Strategy Power - RDT/MLT Internal Stakeholders 
No Outside 
Constituents 
Negative 
effects of 
Opacity 
     
Non-External Sharing 
of Outcomes Power – MLT Internal Stakeholders 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Negative 
effects of 
Opacity 
     
Inaccessibility Power – RDT Internal Stakeholders 
No Outside 
Constituents 
Existence of 
Opacity 
     
Controlling Behavior Power – RDT 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Negative 
effects of 
Opacity 
     
Intensive Time 
Requirements Power – RDT 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Negative 
effects of 
Opacity 
     
High Communication 
Expectations Power – RDT 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Negative 
effects of 
Opacity 
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Appendix G 
Positive Effects of Opacity Coding Summary 
Positives of 
Opacity 
    
Codes A Priori Codes Axial Codes Selective Codes 
Research 
Question 
Discretionary 
Grant making Power - RDT/MLT Unilateral Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Positive 
effects of 
Opacity 
     
Insensitivity to 
External Pressure Power - RDT/MLT Internal Stakeholders 
No Outside 
Constituents 
Positive 
effects of 
Opacity 
     Insider Chemistry 
(board/staff) Power - MLT Unilateral Prerogatives 
No Outside 
Constituents 
Existence of 
Opacity 
     
High Grant 
Accountability Power - RDT Unilateral Prerogatives 
No Outside 
Constituents 
Positive 
effects of 
Opacity 
Inclusion of 
Grantees in 
Planning Hyper Vigilance Unilateral Prerogatives 
Burdened 
Prerogative Theory 
Positive 
effects of 
Opacity 
     Strategic 
Discussions with 
Grantees Hyper Vigilance Unilateral Prerogatives 
Burdened 
Prerogative Theory 
Willingness to 
Partner 
     
Greater Flexibility Lack of Bureaucracy Internal Stakeholders 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Positive 
effects of 
Opacity 
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Codes Emergent Codes Axial Codes Selective Codes 
Research 
Question 
     
Desire to Innovate Hyper Vigilance Unilateral Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Unintended 
Benefits 
     Partnership 
Orientation Hyper Vigilance Unilateral Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Unintended 
Benefits 
     Intangible 
Resources Hyper Vigilance Unilateral Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Unintended 
Benefits 
     Human Touch 
with Grantees Hyper Vigilance Unilateral Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Unintended 
Benefits 
     Willingness to 
Learn with 
Grantees Hyper Vigilance Unilateral Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Unintended 
Benefits 
     Multiple Grants 
With Same Agency Hyper Vigilance Unilateral Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Willingness to 
Partner 
     Interest in 
Capacity Building Hyper Vigilance Unilateral Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Willingness to 
Partner 
     Highly Relational 
Orientation Hyper Vigilance Unilateral Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Unintended 
Benefits 
     Less Procedural 
Orientation Hyper Vigilance Unilateral Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Unintended 
Benefits 
     
Building of Trust Hyper Vigilance Unilateral Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Unintended 
Benefits 
     Tolerance for 
Failure Hyper Vigilance Unilateral Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Unintended 
Benefits 
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Appendix H 
Grantee Coding Summary 
Grantee Strategies 
    
Codes A Priori Codes Axial Codes Selective Codes 
Research 
Question 
Alignment with 
Foundation 
Objectives Power – RDT 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Existence of 
Opacity 
     Intensive 
Communication Power – RDT 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Existence of 
Opacity 
     
Intensive Reporting Power – RDT 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Existence of 
Opacity 
     Development of 
Relationship Power – RDT 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Existence of 
Opacity 
     
Preferred Funder 
Desire for 
Partnered 
Philanthropy Intangible Resources 
Burdened 
Prerogative 
Theory 
Positive effects 
of Opacity 
     
Willingness to be 
Accountable 
Desire for 
Partnered 
Philanthropy Better Outcomes 
Burdened 
Prerogative 
Theory 
Positive effects 
of Opacity 
     
Interest in Innovating 
Desire for 
Partnered 
Philanthropy Better Outcomes 
Burdened 
Prerogative 
Theory 
Openness to 
innovation/risk 
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Appendix I 
Foundation Coding Summary 
Foundation Strategies 
    
Codes A Priori Codes Axial Codes 
Selective 
Codes 
Research 
Question 
Discretionary Grant 
making Power - RDT/MLT 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Positive 
effects of 
Opacity 
     
Insensitivity to External 
Pressure Power - RDT/MLT 
Internal 
Stakeholders 
No Outside 
Constituents 
Positive 
effects of 
Opacity 
     Insider Chemistry 
(board/staff) Power – MLT 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
No Outside 
Constituents 
Existence of 
Opacity 
     
High Grant 
Accountability Power – RDT 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
No Outside 
Constituents 
Positive 
effects of 
Opacity 
Inclusion of Grantees 
in Planning Hyper Vigilance 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
Burdened 
Prerogative 
Theory 
Positive 
effects of 
Opacity 
     
Strategic Discussions 
with Grantees Hyper Vigilance 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
Burdened 
Prerogative 
Theory 
Willingness 
to Partner 
     
Greater Flexibility Lack of Bureaucracy 
Internal 
Stakeholders 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Positive 
effects of 
Opacity 
     Willingness to Take 
Risks Hyper Vigilance 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Unintended 
Benefits 
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Codes Emergent Codes Axial Codes 
Selective 
Codes 
Research 
Question 
Desire to Innovate Hyper Vigilance 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Unintended 
Benefits 
     Partnership 
Orientation Hyper Vigilance 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Unintended 
Benefits 
     
Intangible Resources Hyper Vigilance 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Unintended 
Benefits 
     Human Touch with 
Grantees Hyper Vigilance 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Unintended 
Benefits 
     Willingness to Learn 
with Grantees Hyper Vigilance 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Unintended 
Benefits 
     Multiple Grants With 
Same Agency Hyper Vigilance 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Willingness 
to Partner 
     Interest in Capacity 
Building Hyper Vigilance 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Willingness 
to Partner 
     Highly Relational 
Orientation Hyper Vigilance 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Unintended 
Benefits 
     Less Procedural 
Orientation Hyper Vigilance 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Unintended 
Benefits 
     
Building of Trust Hyper Vigilance 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Unintended 
Benefits 
     
Tolerance for Failure Hyper Vigilance 
Unilateral 
Prerogatives 
Non-External 
Accountability 
Unintended 
Benefits 
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